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Restitution for Child Pornography: Reframing a
System for Victims Harmed by Too Many
MacKenzie Durkin*
Courts have commented that victims of child pornography suffer harm
that is like “a thousand cuts.” This characterization is fitting because once
images of a victim’s childhood sexual abuse are on the internet, the images
are there forever. As a result, these victims are constantly revictimized by
the knowledge that their images are being trafficked and consumed across
the world.
This Comment analyzes the current framework for compensating victims
through criminal restitution. Victims of all federal crimes, including child
pornography offenses, are entitled to restitution for the full amount of their
losses. However, this standard became complicated with child pornography
because of the multitude of offenders responsible for causing the victim’s
harm. In Paroline v. United States, a defendant challenged the Fifth Circuit’s
imposition of joint and several liability for the victim’s losses. The Supreme
Court reversed and held that district courts should order restitution in an
amount which reflects “the defendant’s relative role in the causal process
underlying the victim’s general losses.” In determining this relative role, the
Court listed several factors to consider. The Paroline framework has
garnered criticism for its difficulty to apply and legal inconsistency. Unlike
any other federal crime victim, victims of child pornography are not
guaranteed restitution for their full losses.
Despite complaints by lower courts about the challenges in applying the
Paroline framework, Congress codified the Paroline language in the Amy,
Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of 2018. While
this Act is a step forward, it has shortcomings. At the end of the day, victims
are still left bearing the costs of their own victimization. Thus, this Comment
proposes taking Justice Sotomayor’s solution outlined in her dissenting
opinion in Paroline. This proposal charts what joint and several liability
would look like for child pornography offenses—which are a unique crime
that is particular suited for this treatment because the number of offenders.
Instead of restitution as a “pay-per-view,” restitution can be a means of
* J.D. Candidate, Loyola University Chicago School of Law, 2021. I want to thank the staff of
the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal for their insight and support, as well as family and
friends who helped along the way.
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recognizing the victim’s humanity in the criminal justice system and a way
to help mend the thousand cuts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Judges have described the harm that victims of child sexual abuse
imagery1 suffer as “death by a thousand cuts,”2 referring to the twofold
harm that victims of child sexual abuse imagery suffer.3 First, these
victims have been harmed by the physical sexual abuse that was
recorded.4 Second, they are harmed by the viewership and continuous
circulation of those images.5 Under the Mandatory Victims Restitution
Act, victims of certain federal crimes, including victims of child

1. The commonly used term for these images is child pornography. Child Sexual Abuse Material
(CSAM): Overview, NAT’L CTR. MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILD., http://www.missingkids.com/theissues/sexualabuseimagery [https://perma.cc/5XU5-6QZS] [hereinafter NCMEC
Overview] (last visited Sept. 29, 2019). However, experts have objected to this terminology because pornography of adults is legal and the term does not accurately capture what is depicted in
the images. Id. Because the images portray the sexual abuse and exploitation of children who cannot
consent, experts opted to refer to the images as child sexual abuse imagery. Id. Except when discussing a criminal statute, this Comment will use the term child sexual abuse imagery.
2. See Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 477 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“At bottom, Congress did not intend § 2259 to create a safe harbor for those who inflict upon their victims
the proverbial death by a thousand cuts.”). “Death by a thousand cuts” derives from the harshest
form of execution used in China until 1905 called “ling-chi” or “lingchi chusi.” HENRY NORMAN,
THE PEOPLES AND POLITICS OF THE FAR EAST 224–25 (1895); TIMOTHY BROOK, et al., DEATH BY
A THOUSAND CUTS 11 (2008).
3. See, e.g., Paroline, 572 U.S. at 440–41 (explaining that one of the defendant’s victims wrote
in her victim impact statement that she was abused by her uncle when she was eight and nine years
old, entered therapy, and moved past the trauma, but regressed when she was notified that images
of the abuse had been some of the most circulated series of child sexual abuse images); see also
United States v. Campbell–Zorn, No. CR 14-41, 2014 WL 7215214, at *3–4 (D. Mont. Dec. 17,
2014) (explaining the unclear demarcation between the physical abuse and the abuse caused by the
continuous circulation of the images).
4. Audrey Rogers, Child Pornography’s Forgotten Victims, 28 PACE L. REV. 847, 853–54
(2008) (explaining the physical injuries that the victims incur from the physical sexual abuse); see,
e.g., Paroline, 572 U.S. at 440 (noting that after the physical abuse ended, the victim underwent
therapy for two years and by all appearances, returned “back to normal”).
5. Rogers, supra note 4, at 853–54 (noting the revictimization of victims through the images
depicting their sexual abuse); see also Paroline, 572 U.S. at 440–41 (“Every day of my life I live
in constant fear that someone will see my pictures and recognize me and that I will be humiliated
all over again. It hurts me to know someone is looking at them—at me—when I was just a little
girl being abused for the camera. I did not choose to be there, but now I am there forever in pictures
that people are using to do sick things. I want it all erased. I want it all stopped. But I am powerless
to stop it just like I was powerless to stop my uncle. . . . It’s like I am being abused over and over
and over again.”) (quoting the victim’s witness impact statement); see also SURVIVORS’ SURVEY:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2017, CANADIAN CENTRE FOR CHILD PROTECTION 29 (2017), https://protectchildren.ca/pdfs/C3P_SurvivorsSurveyExecutiveSummary2017_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/36NB-TK97] (providing statistics on victim harm).
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pornography offenses, are entitled to restitution for the full amount of
their losses.6 However, once the images are disseminated on the internet,
district courts struggle to apply the framework announced by the Supreme
Court in Paroline v. United States and later codified in the Amy, Vicky,
and Andy Act of 2018. Paroline and the Act lay out requirements that
victims of child pornography must satisfy in order to recover restitution,
which are unique to victims of child pornography offenses compared to
victims of all other federal crimes.7 Paroline and the Act task district
courts with setting a restitution amount that reflects the relative role of
the defendant—one of an unknowable number of total offenders—in
causing the victim’s harm.8 This Comment will focus on the framework
under which victims are currently compensated and propose a new
system which imposes joint and several liability on all defendants.9
The criminalization of child pornography is a modern innovation that
emerged in the late 1970s.10 By the early 1990s, the child sexual abuse
imagery industry was virtually obliterated after heightened enforcement
of new laws.11 However, the child sexual abuse imagery industry
drastically evolved with the boom of the internet age.12 Since the advent
6. Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A.
7. See generally Campbell–Zorn, 2014 WL 7215214 (complaining about the difficulties in applying the Paroline framework when setting restitution amounts for individual offenders); see also
United States v. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d 1309, 1328–35 (11th Cir. 2019).
8. See generally, Paroline, 572 U.S. at 437 (holding that defendants are liable for their “relative
role” in the causal process underlying the victim’s losses and outlining factors for district courts to
consider when setting a restitution amount); see also United States v. Sainz, 827 F.3d 602, 605 (7th
Cir. 2016) (describing how the Paroline court handled the “difficult, nearly intractable problem”
of setting a monetary amount for restitution).
9. “When, under applicable law, some persons are jointly and severally liable to an injured person, the person may sue for and recover the full amount of recoverable damages from any jointly
and severally liable person.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 10 (AM. L. INST. 2000). “Each
person who commits a tort that requires intent is jointly and severally liable for any indivisible
injury legally caused by the tortious conduct.” Id. § 12.
10. See infra Section II.A (detailing the criminalization of child sexual abuse imagery).
11. VIRGINIA M. KENDALL & T. MARKUS FUNK, CHILD EXPLOITATION AND TRAFFICKING:
EXAMINING GLOBAL ENFORCEMENT AND SUPPLY CHAIN CHALLENGES AND U.S. RESPONSES 81
(2nd ed. 2017) (explaining that child sexual abuse imagery was just regulated as obscene speech
prior to 1977); see also James R. Marsh, Masha’s Law: A Federal Civil Remedy for Child Pornography Victims, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 459, 460 (2011) [hereinafter Marsh, Masha’s Law] (noting
that child pornography has only been criminalized for thirty years).
12. Cassell Bryan-Low, Internet Transforms Child Pornography Into Lucrative Criminal
Trade, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2006, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB113746679863248267 [https://perma.cc/VT5S-BDD4] (explaining that law enforcement
efforts in the 1980s obliterate the child pornography industry); see also Emily Bazelon, The Price
of a Stolen Childhood, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 24, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/27/magazine/how-much-can-restitution-help-victims-of-child-pornography.html?hpw&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/Q5Q3-8TWB] (explaining that changes in the law and increased law enforcement led to a decrease in the distribution and production of child sexual abuse
imagery).
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of the internet, the child sexual abuse imagery market has reemerged and
developed into a global, multibillion-dollar industry.13
Recognizing the harm inflicted on victims of crime, Congress enacted
the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 to try to make victims of
crime whole.14 Restitution compensates victims for the losses caused by
an offender’s criminal conduct.15 Section 2259 mandates that district
courts order restitution for child pornography offenses under the
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act.16 Due to the number of child
pornography offenders, issues arose in restitution hearings regarding the
causation standard and standard for determining an amount for
restitution.17
In Paroline v. United States, the Supreme Court confronted the
causation standard in the mandatory restitution statute for child
pornography offenses, § 2259, and created a framework for setting a
restitution amount.18 In the 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court held that
restitution amounts should be based on “the defendant’s relative role in
the causal process that underlies the victim’s general losses,”19 and
created guideposts for district courts to consider when setting an amount

13. Jeremy Prichard et al., Internet Subcultures and Pathways to the Use of Child Pornography,
27 COMPUT. L. SEC. REV. 585, 587 (2011) (“Asides from the accessibility of child pornography
online, the anonymity afforded by the Internet facilitates onset.” (citation omitted)); see also Michael H. Keller & Gabriel J.X. Dance, The Internet Is Overrun with Images of Child Sexual Abuse.
What Went Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/09/28/us/child-sexabuse.html [https://perma.cc/L69W-CAY2] (last visited Dec. 21, 2020) (noting the growth of child
sexual abuse materials on the internet).
14. See generally Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A–3664 (ordering restitution to victims of certain crimes); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2259 (mandating restitution for victims
of child pornography offenses).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 2259 (stating that victims can receive compensation for medical losses, transportation costs, lost wages, rehabilitation, attorney fees and other costs incurred, and all other relevant losses incurred by the victim); see also Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 443 (2014)
(further explaining § 2259 as it relates to Paroline).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 2259 (ordering enforcement under §§ 3663A–3664); see also Paroline, 572
U.S. at 443 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(4)(A); 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e)) (noting that under § 2259,
“[t]he issuance of a restitution order under this section is mandatory," and that order "shall be issued
and enforced in accordance with section 3664”).
17. See Paroline, 572 U.S. at 439, 443 (remarking that the Court granted certiorari to resolve a
split on the causation standard and standard for ordering an amount of restitution for child pornography offenses); see generally United States v. Gamble, 709 F.3d 541 (6th Cir. 2013) (discussing
the complicated causation standard debate).
18. See generally Paroline, 572 U.S. 434; see also Paul G. Cassell & James R. Marsh, The New
Amy, Vicky, and Andy Act: A Positive Step Towards Full Restitution of Child Pornography Victims,
31 FED. SENT’G REP. (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3317733 [https://perma.cc/B93QNA2G] (explaining Justice Kennedy’s analysis of proximate causation and the Paroline framework).
19. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 458; United States v. Galan, 804 F.3d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 2015)
(explaining the Paroline framework).

562

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 52

for restitution.20 The Amy, Vicky, and Andy21 Child Pornography Victim
Assistance Act of 2018 amended § 2259,22 codifying the “relative role”
language from Paroline into the standard for setting amounts for
restitution.23
Since Paroline, the federal circuits have split on the issue of
disaggregation when determining the defendants’ “relative role.”24
Defendants are now arguing that courts must disaggregate losses before
setting an amount for the restitution award.25 Disaggregation requires
courts to separate (or disaggregate) the losses caused by the physical
abuse from losses caused by subsequent distribution and possession of
the images before the court sets an amount for restitution.26 Offenders
advocating for disaggregation argue that the district court must apportion
the defendant’s contribution to the victim’s harm only after taking away
the harm caused by the initial physical abuse.27 This is important because
20. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 460 (listing various factors for district courts to consider in this inquiry); see also United States v. Dillard, 891 F.3d 151, 161 (4th Cir. 2018) (discussing the Paroline
factors).
21. Amy, Vicky, and Andy are the pseudonyms of three victims of heavily trafficked series of
child sexual abuse imagery, who now advocate for victims. When discussing victims, courts refer
to the victims by pseudonyms to protect their privacy. Melanie Reid & Curtis L. Collier, When
Does Restitution Become Retribution?, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 653, 656 n.18 (2012).
22. See generally Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of 2018,
18 U.S.C. § 2259 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2259 (1994)).
23. Id. (“[T]he court shall order restitution in an amount that reflects the defendant’s relative
role in the causal process that underlies the victim’s losses . . . .”).
24. See generally United States v. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding that
there is no disaggregation requirement); United States v. Halverson, 897 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 2018);
United States v. Bordman 895 F.3d 1048 (8th Cir. 2018); United States v. Monzel, 930 F.3d 470
(D.C. Cir. 2019); but see Galan, 804 F.3d at 1291 (holding that there is a disaggregation requirement); United States v. Dunn, 777 F.3d 1171, 1181–82 (10th Cir. 2015).
25. Halverson, 897 F.3d at 654 n.4 (“Halverson argues that many of the psychological reports
submitted by the victims did not separate the losses caused by Halverson from the losses caused by
other abusers . . . .”); Bordman, 895 F.3d at 1056 (“Third, Bordman argues that the district court
abused its discretion by failing to disaggregate the harm caused by the initial abuse from the harm
caused by his later possession.”); Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1314 (“Rothenberg argued, by contrast,
that the starting point should be ‘apportionment between the original abuser of the child, versus the
distributor, and later, possessor of the pornography,’ which Rothenberg referred to as ‘disaggregation.’ Rothenberg asserted that this disaggregation requires two steps: first, the district court must
separate the harm caused by the original abuser from that caused by later distributors and possessors; and second, the district court must separate the harm caused by the defendant from that caused
by other distributors or possessors.”); Monzel, 930 F.3d at 480 (“Specifically, he objects that the
government failed . . . to disaggregate Amy’s initial-abuse losses from her general loss figure . . . .”).
26. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1333 (explaining that disaggregation would require courts to determine what losses are attributable to the circulation of the images and what losses are attributable
to the physical abuse); see also Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 443, 449 (2014) (commenting
in dicta that “[c]omplications may arise in disaggregating losses sustained as a result of the initial
physical abuse . . . .”).
27. Rothenberg Petition for Certiorari, infra note 28, at 18 (“But without first isolating the losses
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it directly impacts what victims need to prove and the amount of money
defendants are ordered to pay.28 Since defendants began arguing this
point, two circuits adopted a disaggregation requirement, four circuits
rejected the disaggregation requirement, and the remaining circuits have
not addressed the issue.29
First, this Comment argues that a disaggregation requirement conflicts
with Supreme Court precedent.30 After considering the various struggles
voiced by lower courts,31 this Comment argues that the Paroline
framework needs to be reworked.32 Additionally, it argues that the 2018
amendment to § 2559, which codified the exact language of Paroline,
was an inadequate response because courts continue facing similar
challenges in applying and interpreting it.33 This Comment proposes that
defendants convicted of child pornography offenses should be held
jointly and severally liable for the full amount of the victim’s
demonstrated losses, with certain provisions to simplify the process of
recovering restitution and to protect criminal defendants.34
Part II of this Comment discusses the background of the child
pornography industry and criminalization, mandatory restitution and its
caused by the ongoing traffic, and excluding the losses caused by the [initial] abuse, there is an
intolerable risk that the court will hold the defendant liable for losses that he played no role in
causing.”); see, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 758 F.3d 37, 39 (1st Cir. 2014) (affirming the district
court because it based the restitution order on the losses caused by the continuous trafficking of
Vicky’s images and excluding the therapy costs related to her father and men).
28. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15, United States v. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir.
2019) (No. 17-12349) [hereinafter Rothenberg Petition for Certiorari] (explaining that there will be
sentencing disparities among similarly situated defendants and that victims’ claims packages will
be rejected by courts in jurisdictions that require disaggregation).
29. See Rothenberg Petition for Certiorari, supra note 28, at 8–15 (noting the differences in
reasoning between various circuits that are confronted with this issue); see generally Rothenberg,
923 F.3d 1309 (holding that there is not a disaggregation requirement); Halverson, 897 F.3d 645;
Bordman, 895 F.3d 1048; Monzel, 930 F.3d 470; but see Galan, 804 F.3d at 1291 (holding that
there is a disaggregation requirement); Dunn, 777 F.3d at 1181–82.
30. See generally infra Part V; see Paroline, 572 U.S. at 460 (“These factors need not be converted into a rigid formula . . . .”); see also Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1334.
31. See generally infra Part V; see Paroline, 572 U.S. at 463 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing
that the majority created a framework that was substantially different from the statute that Congress
enacted); see also United States v. Berry, No. 18-CR-00107, 2019 WL 5306960, at *2 (D. Or. Oct.
21, 2019) (“I was not alone in joining Chief Justice Robert’s [sic] and Justice Sotomayor’s calls for
Congressional action.”) (citing United States v. Schultz, No. 14-10085, 2015 WL 5972421, at *3
(D. Mass. Oct. 14, 2015); United States v. Whitely, 354 F. Supp. 3d 930, 939 (N.D. Ill. 2019)).
32. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 463 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (stating that when it comes to possession, “it is not possible to do anything more than pick an arbitrary number” as “the amount of the
loss sustained by the victim”); see also Berry, 2019 WL 5306960, at *2 (noting that the amendment
ensures that district courts will no longer order token or nominal amounts of restitution).
33. See generally infra Part IV (explaining that the amendment did little to assist lower courts’
calls for a more structured system); Berry, 2019 WL 5306960, at *2.
34. See generally infra Part V (arguing that periodic payment systems could alleviate concern
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application, and the seminal Supreme Court decision in Paroline v.
United States. Then, Part III explains the circuit split on disaggregation
and the Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance
Act of 2018. Part IV analyzes the disaggregation split, the Paroline
framework, and the Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim
Assistance Act of 2018. It will demonstrate the inconsistency between
the disaggregation argument with the Paroline decision. Further, it will
show the difficulties with the Paroline framework. It also recognizes the
forward steps made in the most recent Act but points out some of the
Act’s shortfalls. Lastly, Part V details the proposal for joint and several
liability, which will require a partial payment schedule, create a cause of
action for contribution, and give the initial restitution hearing full faith
and credit.
II. BACKGROUND
Child pornography is a newly developing and complex area of crime
and the law.35 The first Section discusses the modern innovation of
criminalizing child pornography and the impact of the initial legislative
efforts. The following Section focuses on the impact of the child sexual
abuse industry on victims, the internet’s role in the growth of the industry,
and the global magnitude of the industry. Then, this Comment explains
restitution and the federal statute which mandates restitution to child
pornography victims—§ 2259—and details the 1/n calculations, which
many courts employ when setting a restitution amount. The last Sections
describe the circuit split preceding Paroline and explains the process by
which victims recover restitution.
A. The Criminalization and Initial Obliteration of Child Sexual Abuse
Imagery
Compared to other crimes, the criminalization of child sexual abuse
imagery is a recent development in criminal law.36 Prior to the late 1970s,
child sexual abuse imagery was legal unless it was obscene, which is
that joint and several liability is unfair); see also Paroline, 572 U.S. at 485 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (explaining that enforcement of § 2259 is under § 3664, which allows courts to implement
partial periodic payment schedules).
35. See generally Paroline, 572 U.S. 434 (discussing the atypical causal process which harms
victims); see also RICHARD WORTLEY & STEPHEN SMALLBONE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: OFFICE
OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET (May 2006) (explaining the various complexities in effectively investigating and prosecuting these cases).
36. KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 81 (noting that the prosecution of child pornography
is “a fairly recent development”); see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749 (1982) (“In
recent years, the exploitive use of children in the production of pornography has become a serious
national problem. The Federal Government and 47 States have sought to combat the problem with
statutes specifically directed at the production of child pornography.”).
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unprotected speech under the First Amendment.37 At that time, the
government could only criminalize child sexual abuse imagery if it
satisfied the obscenity standard laid out in Miller v. California.38 The first
federal child pornography statute enacted was the Protection of Children
Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, which criminalized the
production and distribution—but not possession—of obscene visual
depictions of minors under the age of sixteen.39 The statute used the
Miller framework to differentiate protected materials of minors engaged
in sexually explicit conduct from obscene images of minors engaged in
sexually explicit conduct.40 However, in 1982, the Supreme Court carved
out a new standard for child pornography in the First Amendment
context.41
In New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court modified First Amendment
jurisprudence regarding depictions of sexual activity involving
37. KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 81 (noting that prior to the Protection of Children
Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, child pornography was “simply treated as ‘obscene
speech’”); Warren Binford et al., Beyond Paroline: Ensuring Meaningful Remedies for Child Pornography Victims at Home and Abroad, 35 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 117, 130 (2015) (explaining that
before the 1970s, courts relied on incest, rape, and child welfare statutes to prosecute individuals
involved in the sexual exploitation of children); see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20–21
(1973) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484–85 (1957)) (“But implicit in the history
of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance. . . . We hold that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or
press.”).
38. KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 81 (noting that child pornography was regulated under
the Miller analysis, which held that the government could criminalize “obscene” material if the
material met three factors); Binford et al., supra note 37, at 130 (explaining that the Protection of
Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, which criminalized “sexually explicit” pornography of minors under the age of sixteen, was a product of the victims’ rights movement). To be
obscene, a finder of fact must decide that (1) an average person, applying contemporary community
standards, would find the work as a whole appealed to a prurient interest; (2) the work depicts or
describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive way; and (3) the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citing Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972); quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 489). In Miller, the Court abandoned the
requirement that the material be “utterly without redeeming social value” created in Memoirs v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966). Id. at 24–25.
39. KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 81 (noting that creation of the Protection of Children
Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 arose “out of the need to address a problem that was not
adequately being addressed by the obscenity statute”); Binford et al., supra note 37, at 130 (“This
movement [referring to the victims’ rights movement] led Congress to enact the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, which criminalized the commercial production and
distribution of any ‘sexually explicit’ pornography that utilized an individual under the age of sixteen”).
40. KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 81 (noting that this Act took the Miller scheme “one
step further”); Binford et al., supra note 37, at 131 (explaining that after Ferber, Congress passed
the Child Protection Act of 1984 which removed the obscenity requirement).
41. KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 82 (“In 1982, the Supreme Court held that the states
have a compelling interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of minors . . . . Differentiating child pornography from general pornography and other obscene speech,
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children.42 The case dealt with the constitutionality of a New York state
statute proscribing depictions of minors engaged in sexual intercourse
without requiring a finding that the depictions were obscene. The Court
found that the concerns43 that shaped obscenity jurisprudence did not
apply to the regulation of child sexual abuse imagery.44 The Supreme
Court held that the state’s interest in “‘safeguarding the physical and
psychological well-being of a minor’ is ‘compelling’”45 and upheld the
statute.46 Thus, Ferber removed the obscenity requirement for child
pornography offenses.47
In response to Ferber, Congress enacted the Child Pornography Act of
1984, which discarded the obscenity test from the 1977 law and raised
the age of victims for punishable depictions from sixteen years old to
eighteen years old.48 In 1984, Congress expanded the definition of
sexually explicit conduct to include lascivious exhibition of the genital

the [Supreme C]ourt held that child pornography is outside the protection of the First Amendment.”); see generally New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (holding that child pornography
is not protected speech).
42. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 749 (noting that at least half of the statutes did not require that the
material be legally obscene before criminalizing it). In Ferber, the defendant, Paul Ira Ferber, sold
two videos depicting young boys masturbating to undercover agents. Id. at 752. At the time, in New
York, there were two statutes that criminalized the distribution of child pornography—one had an
obscenity requirement and the other did not. Id. He was indicted under both statutes. Id. The jury
found Ferber guilty under the statute without the obscenity requirement, and acquitted Ferber under
the statute with the obscenity requirement. Id.
43. Id. at 754–55 (discussing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); and many other cases which have struggled with the balance
between protecting free speech and limiting obscenity).
44. Id. at 756.
45. Id. at 756–57 (noting that the Court has upheld legislation protecting children in many instances and highlighting the importance of protecting children from childhood sexual exploitation).
The Court explained that “[t]he care of children is a sacred trust and should not be abused by those
who seek to profit through a commercial network based upon the exploitation of children. The
public policy of the state demands the protection of children from exploitation through sexual performances.” Id. at 757 (quoting 1977 N.Y. Laws, ch. 90 § 1); see also id. at 759 (finding that child
pornography harms minors by memorializing their abuse and exacerbating the harm through circulating the images).
46. Id. at 758; KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 82 (noting that the Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute by “applying a stricter test than the one set forth in Miller”).
47. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761; KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 82 (“Differentiating child
pornography from general pornography and other obscene speech, the Ferber court held that child
pornography is outside the protection of the First Amendment. . . . ‘[A court] need not find that the
material appeals to the prurient interest of the average person; it is not required that sexual conduct
portrayed be done so in a patently offensive manner; and the material at issue need not be considered as a whole.’”).
48. KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 81–87 (outlining the various federal laws on child
pornography and the development of the different statutes); see also WORTLEY & SMALLBONE,
supra note 35, at 5 (charting the important cases and statutes in the development of child pornography laws).
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area of any person.49 Under the lascivious standard, even images that did
not depict sexual acts could be criminalized.50 Finally, in 1990, the
Supreme Court upheld the criminalization of the private possession of
child pornography.51
Responding to growing public awareness52 and developments in
technology,53 Congress amended the federal offenses in 1988 and 1990,
tightening restrictions on child sexual abuse imagery by imposing heavier
penalties and criminalizing the use of computers to depict or advertise
child pornography.54 A few years later, Congress enacted the Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996.55 This Act proscribed virtually
created images of children, morphed images of children, and images
appearing to be a minor.56 In 2002, the Supreme Court limited the
49. United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 830–31 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (explaining that the decision to replace “lewd” with “lascivious” was because “lewd” was associated with obscenity and
Congress wanted to be clear that the matters did not need to meet the obscenity standard);
WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 5.
50. See Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 832 (explaining that lascivious exhibition can be decided by the
trier of fact by considering whether the focal point of the image is the child’s genitalia, whether the
child is positioned in a sexually suggestive pose, whether the child is in an unnatural pose or inappropriate attire, whether the child is clothed or nude, whether the image suggests sexual coyness,
or whether the image is intended to elicit a sexual response); WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note
35, at 6 (noting that this standard captured videos in which the camera focused on the clothed genital
region of young girls).
51. Osbourne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108–11 (1990) (noting that criminalization of possession
might encourage possessors to destroy the material, ending the abusive circulation of the images,
and refusing to extend Stanley to protect possession of child pornography); but see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567–68 (1969) (holding that individuals have a constitutional right to possess
pornography within the home but not addressing whether this extended to child pornography).
52. See, e.g., Marcia Chambers, Sexual Abuse of Boys: Case in Brooklyn Focuses Attention on
a Nationwide Problem, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1984, at B5 (describing a 13-year-old boy’s account
which uncovered the abuse of ten other children, leading to the arrests of several recognized professionals and noting that the FBI and police viewed the “adult exploitation of boys . . . as a nationwide problem”); Woman Charged in Child Pornography Operation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1982,
at 28 (reporting the arrest of a mother who controlled as much as eighty percent of the country’s
child pornography and had mailing lists of 30,000 names and 7,000 subscribers seeking “deviate
material”).
53. KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 82 (explaining that developments in technology presented a challenge to the enforcement of child pornography statutes); Binford et al., supra note 37,
at 123 (noting that “easy-to-use cameras” that developed in the mid-twentieth century contributed
to the growth of the child sexual abuse imagery).
54. KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 82–83; Binford et al., supra note 37, at 131 (explaining
that the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 was the first move by the federal government
to address child sexual abuse imagery in the digital age by criminalizing the distribution and receipt
of child sexual abuse imagery through electronic means).
55. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, H.R. 4123, 104th Cong. (1996) [hereinafter
CPPA]; KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 83 (noting that Congress enacted the CPPA six years
later, “further expanding the reach of child protection statutes and broadening the definition of child
pornography . . . .”).
56. CPPA, supra note 55, at 7 (defining child pornography as depictions appearing to include
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criminalization of child pornography in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition
by holding that the government can only proscribe offenses involving the
interests of real children.57 Thus, the government must prove that the
images depict a real child, that an innocent image of a real child was
altered into a sexually explicit or suggestive image, or that a sexually
explicit or suggestive image uses the likeness of a real child.58 The
government can only prosecute offenses based on images that harm real
children. Computer-generated images of fake children or images that
appear to depict children but do not actually (such as actors purporting to
be underaged) are legal.59
The child sexual abuse imagery industry was virtually eliminated by
the early 1990s due to the growing public awareness, more stringent
statutes, and stricter enforcement of the laws.60 It became much riskier to
physically exchange the materials through the mail or during meetings.61
The increased penalties and law enforcement action successfully reduced
the expansion of the industry to the point of virtual nonexistence.62

children engaged in sexually explicit conduct and depictions advertising that the images contain
children engaged in sexually explicit conduct); KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 83–84 (describing the expanded definition of “child pornography” and noting that this Act expanded the definition to include “images that may have been created without the use of actual minors”).
57. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 242, 251 (2002) (rejecting the argument
that the statute was justified due to the possibility that the images could be used to groom children
for future abuse); see also KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 84 (explaining that the Court was
hearing challenges from the nudist community and the adult entertainment industry).
58. See generally Ashcroft, 535 U.S. 234; KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 84–85 (analyzing the Supreme Court’s holding in Ashcroft).
59. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 245–48 (noting that the age of consent and marriage are sixteen and
that teenage sexual activity and sexual abuse of children have inspired various literary works such
as Romeo and Juliet and the movies Traffic and American Beauty); see also KENDALL & FUNK,
supra note 11, at 85 (remarking that the standards under the CPPA would criminalize “mainstream
Hollywood movies” and “falsely marked products”).
60. Proliferation of Child Pornography on the Internet: Hearing before the S. Comm. of the
Comm. on Appropriations, 105th Cong. 2 (1997) [hereinafter Senate Committee Hearing] (“By the
early 1990’s, the cottage trade of child pornography was almost nonexistent, due to the U.S. Postal
Service’s commitment to catching child pornographers who distribute material through the U.S.
mail.”); William R. Graham, Jr., Uncovering and Eliminating Child Pornography Rings on the
Internet: Issues Regarding and Avenues Facilitating Law Enforcement’s Access to ‘Wonderland’,
2000 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 457, 467 (2000) (stating that the Child Pornography Prevention Act
successfully controlled child sexual abuse imagery in print media by the late 1980s).
61. Senate Committee Hearing, supra note 60, at 3 (explaining that while the exchange of child
pornography though the mail has mostly been controlled, the exchange and solicitation via the
internet is a huge issue); Graham, supra note 60, at 467 (noting that with the criminalization of the
distribution of child pornography, the possession of any child pornography was now a criminal
offense).
62. Bryan-Low, supra note 12 (“In the 1980s, a broad crackdown in the U.S. and other countries
largely choked off the flow of child pornography, forcing it out of its traditional niche of sex
bookshops and into underground networks of collectors.”); Emily Bazelon, The Price of a Stolen
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B. Child Sexual Abuse Imagery is a Growing Global Issue in the
Internet Age
The rise of the internet transformed child sexual abuse imagery into a
global industry and exacerbated victims’ harms.63 Growing numbers and
advanced technologies have made it increasingly difficult for law
enforcement to track and prosecute offenders.64 This Section first
discusses the impact on victims, then explains the impact of the internet,
and finally explores the global magnitude of the industry.
1. The Impact of Child Sexual Abuse Imagery on Victims
Victims of child sexual abuse imagery incur significant losses as a
result of the image circulation.65 Many face difficulties moving past the
abuse because the pictures and videos memorialize the abuse forever.66
A large number of victims report that the images impact them differently
than physical abuse because the images are permanently on the internet
and continuously distributed.67 Additionally, the distribution of the
images contributes to feelings of powerlessness, shame, and
humiliation.68 Victims express fear of being recognized in public or being

Childhood, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 24, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/27/magazine/how-much-can-restitution-help-victims-of-child-pornography.html?hpw&_r=0
[https://perma.cc/Q5Q3-8TWB] (explaining that congressional and state actions approved by the
Supreme Court lead to plummeting distribution and production of child sexual abuse imagery).
63. Binford et al., supra note 37, at 117 (noting that the National Center of Missing and Exploited Children has described child pornography as a “crime of international distribution”); see
generally infra Sections II.B.2–3.
64. KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 179 (explaining that, due to the rise of the internet, the
child pornography industry has outpaced law enforcement’s ability to investigate and prosecute
offenders); see generally infra Sections II.B.2–3.
65. See e.g., Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 441 (2014) (stating that Amy reported $3.4
million in losses); see also United States v. Sainz, 827 F.3d 602, 606 (7th Cir. 2016) (remarking
that one-third of Cindy’s losses was $366,000.00).
66. DOJ CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, infra note 72, at 3 (“The child victims are first sexually
assaulted in order to produce the vile, and often, violent, images. They are then victimized again
when these images of their sexual assault are traded over the Internet in massive numbers by likeminded people across the globe.”); see, e.g., Binford et al., supra note 37, at 117 (stating that since
2002, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children has processed over 70,000 files containing images of Amy’s sexual abuse and noting that her images have been recovered in Denmark,
Germany, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand).
67. SURVIVORS’ SURVEY, supra note 5; United States v. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d 1309, 1319 (11th
Cir. 2019) (“Jenny expressed a strong desire to forget the abuse she had suffered but explained that
‘[w]ith the pictures still out there I can’t.’”); Ateret Gewirtz-Meydan, et al., The Complex Experience of Child Pornography Survivors, 80 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 238, 244 (2018) (explaining
that the images were different from the physical abuse because they could be “interpreted as [the
child victim] participating voluntarily in the crime” and the ongoing vulnerability of having the
images on the internet for anyone to see).
68. SURVIVORS’ SURVEY, supra note 5; (displaying responses to being asked how the imagery
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tracked down by people who have seen the images.69 Many suffer from
severe psychological and psychiatric disorders.70 Further, the abuse
negatively impacts victims’ work experiences, academic success, family
life, friendships, and sexual relationships.71
2. The Role of the Internet in the Growth of the Child Sexual Abuse
Imagery Industry
The number of images of child pornography on the internet has
exponentially grown in the past twenty years.72 From 1998 to 2018,
yearly reports for child sexual abuse imagery jumped from 3,000 to 18.4
million—the latter report flagged 45 million unique images and videos of
child sexual abuse imagery.73
Experts and law enforcement acknowledge that the internet has
“dramatically changed the scale and nature” of the child sexual abuse

impacts them differently from hands-on abuse); Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1318 (“In her victim impact statements, Vicky described the effects of the ongoing distribution of the images of her sexual
abuse as a child, including feelings of fear and paranoia, nightmares, and panic attacks. In a 2014
psychological status report, Dr. Green opined that Vicky continued to require therapy as a result of
the continuing traffic in her images, as well as her discovery of attempts by some viewers of her
images to invade her privacy. Dr. Green explained that Vicky continued to experience anxiety,
dissociative responses, social withdrawal, anger, feelings of powerlessness, and sleep disruption.”).
69. SURVIVORS’ SURVEY, supra note 5 (reporting that approximately a third of victims have
been identified by a person who has seen the victim’s images, that over 80% have been targeted by
someone that has seen imagery of the abuse, that substantial amounts suffer further trauma and fear
from being identified, and that they were being targeted to be propositioned, revictimized, blackmailed, and threatened); Gewirtz-Meydan et al., supra note 67, at 244 (“‘When a man approaches
at the grocery store and tells me that he knows me from somewhere or that he recognizes me. . . I
get so scared that he has seen my images.[’] . . . . ‘I can’t run for public office or speak in public
beyond a certain level for fear of my photo getting out there.’ . . . . ‘I am afraid that people have
seen them. Thinking strangers recognize me from the images.’”).
70. SURVIVORS’ SURVEY, supra note 5, at 31 (reporting that two-thirds or more of victims experience self-harm, depression, relationship difficulties, suicidal ideation, body image difficulties,
hypervigilance, sleeping difficulties, and anxiety); CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE STATISTICS, DARKNESS
TO LIGHT 1–4 (2015) (explaining the various psychological, physical, and social problems that
victims of child sexual abuse faces at higher rates).
71. SURVIVORS’ SURVEY, supra note 5, at 30 (reporting that over half of victims experience
negative effects including intimacy issues, trust issues, sexual intimacy issues, lack of contact with
family, unsupportive family, difficulties concentrating, inability to complete schooling); CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE STATISTICS, supra note 70, at 2–3 (noting adverse impacts to academic success,
substance abuse issues, and long-term mental health impacts).
72. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CHILD EXPLOITATION PREVENTION
AND INTERDICTION: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (2010) (“The expansion of the Internet has led to
an explosion in the market for child pornography . . . .”) [hereinafter DOJ CONGRESSIONAL
REPORT]. See also WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 12 (“It is difficult to be precise
about the extent of Internet child pornography, but all of the available evidence points it to being a
major and growing problem. At any one time there are estimated to be more than one million pornographic images of children on the Internet, with 200 new images posted daily.”).
73. Keller & Dance, supra note 13 (exhibiting growth in reports of child sexual abuse imagery
from 3,000 in 1998, to 100,000 in 2008, to over 1 million in 2014, to 18.4 million in 2018).

2021]

Restitution for Child Pornography

571

industry.74 The internet escalated the problem of child sexual abuse
imagery in several ways, including permitting users access to vast
quantities of images from around the world; increasing the availability of
accessing images to any time or place; allowing for private and
anonymous access; facilitating nameless communication and image
sharing between offenders; providing relatively inexpensive imagery;
improving the quality and storage of the images; expanding the formats
to include everything from pictures, videos, and sound to real-time and
interactive experiences; and allowing access to morphed or modified
images.75
Advances in technology negatively impact abused children in the
United States and across the globe.76 The proliferation of the internet
allows consumers from the United States to gain new material from
abusers in other countries.77 Additionally, digital cameras, webcams, and
cellphone cameras allow abusers to more easily record high-quality
imagery without the detection that occurs during the development of
film.78 Lastly, the internet allows offenders to trade, upload, and
disseminate child sexual abuse imagery at unprecedented rates.79 While
there are risks, like sting operations by law enforcement and shutdowns
of illicit websites, new websites reopen at faster rates than law
enforcement can keep up with, and offenders continuously advance their
74. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 1 (noting that this change caused by the advent
of the internet “has required new approaches to investigation and control”). See also Prichard et al.,
supra note 13, at 589 (“It is generally accepted that the supply of and demand for child pornography
has dramatically increased with the advent of the Internet.”).
75. See WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 8 (explaining how the internet has “escalated the problem of child pornography” in various ways); see also DOJ CONGRESSIONAL REPORT,
supra note 72, at 3 (explaining the impact of the internet on the child sexual abuse imagery industry
and enforcement of child pornography laws).
76. See WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 9 (explaining that the internet allows the
distribution of images abroad and increasingly sophisticated technology allows offenders to make
higher quality homemade recordings); see also Bryan-Low, supra note 12 (“[T]he Internet has
transformed what was once a cottage industry into a sophisticated business.”).
77. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 9 (noting that many images circulating on the
internet “often document the abuse of children in third-world countries” and “images may be stored
on servers located almost anywhere in the world”). See, e.g., Bryan-Low, supra note 12 (reporting
the story of a foreign syndicate that ran child sexual abuse imagery websites with customers from
all over the world).
78. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 9 (noting that with the development of electronic recording devices, like digital cameras and web cams, individuals can create high quality,
homemade images). See KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 20–21 (explaining the technology
used by offenders to create child sexual abuse imagery, avoid detection from law enforcement, and
distribute child sexual abuse imagery).
79. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 9 (“Child pornography may be uploaded to the
Internet on websites or exchanged via e-mail, instant messages, newsgroups, bulletin boards, chatrooms, and peer-to-peer (P2P) networks.”). See Prichard et al., supra note 13, at 590 (explaining
that new methods of communication via the internet caused an evolution of the child pornography
industry).
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security measures, which allows them to fall through the cracks.80
Easier avenues for obtaining and viewing child pornography on the
internet led to higher numbers of offenders and more organization
between offenders.81 Because the images are more readily available for
viewing within the privacy of a personal device, there has been a growth
of offenders who do not have sexual compulsions toward children.82
Additionally, the ability to connect and communicate on the internet has
increased the level of organization between offenders.83
There are several kinds of offenders in these cases. 84 For example,
there are collectors who procure and share child sexual abuse imagery in
chatrooms, websites, emails, and file-sharing programs.85 The levels of
security used by the collectors vary—some do not use any security while
others employ sophisticated encryption and file destroying technology.86

80. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 9–10 (“Child pornography websites are often
shut down as soon as they are discovered . . . . Increasingly those distributing child pornography
are employing more sophisticated security measures to elude detection and are being driven to
hidden levels of the Internet.” (citation omitted)); KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 20 (explaining that offenders use encryption technology that inhibits law enforcement from accessing the images, for instance one computer used encryption technology that was so sophisticated that neither
NSA or NASA computers could break it or view the entirety of the defendant’s collection).
81. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 12–13. (“It is difficult to be precise about the
extent of Internet child pornography, but all of the available evidence points to it being a major and
growing problem.”). See KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 19 (“The dramatic growth of the
Internet, social networking, and electronic means of communication, and the digitalization of the
international community have significantly impacted the manner in which sexual offenders commit
crimes.”); see generally Keller & Dance, supra note 13 (explaining the growth of the child sexual
abuse imagery industry after the internet boom).
82. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 14–15 (explaining that individuals with curiosities or less intense interests in child pornography and children as sexual objects are more likely
to offend as a result of easy access to the images on the internet); Prichard et al., supra note 13, at
587 (explaining that individuals are more likely to view child sexual abuse imagery “impulsively
and/or out of curiosity” because it is so easily accessible on the internet).
83. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 14–16; KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at
22 (“When coupled with the offender’s communications with other offenders via the Internet in
chat rooms or through e-mails—including providing accolades for each incident of exploitation—
this unique characteristic of child pornography reinforces the distorted fantasy that the deviant sexual behavior has some social merit.”).
84. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 15–17 (describing the different typology of
child pornography offenders and their associated patterns of internet behavior, level of involvement, degree of networking, expertise in employing security strategies, and extent to which their
internet behavior involves direct sexual abuse of children); KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at
21–28 (explaining that there are offenders involved in hands-on abuse, offenders that just view
child sexual abuse imagery, manufacturers, situational offenders, preferential offenders, sex travelers, and groomers).
85. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 15–16 (describing the behavior of both nonsecure and secure collectors). See KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 19 (explaining that offenders use online technology to connect with other offenders and collect images of child sexual abuse).
86. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 15–16 (describing the various security strate-
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Collectors’ networks also vary—some engage in casual communications
while others are members of pedophile rings.87 On one hand, collectors
that have less structured networks and do not use security technology are
limited in the kind and quantity of images they can obtain.88 On the other
hand, collectors that employ advanced technology and maintain
structured networks have access to more images and more severe
content.89 Additionally, there are groomers who develop relationships
with children to abuse them.90 They use child sexual abuse imagery to
gies employed by different types of collectors); see Dominique A. Simmons, Sex Offender Typologies, U.S. DEP’T JUST. OFF. SMART https://www.smart.gov/SOMAPI/sec1/ch3_typology.html
[https://perma.cc/VEA7-J8PB] (explaining the various types of sex and child pornography offenders) (last visited Oct. 22, 2020).
87. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 15–16 (describing the various levels of networking used by different collectors); see e.g., Megan Jones, Montgomery Man Sentenced to 17
Years in Prison for Creating and Sharing Child Porn in Online Chatrooms, BEACON NEWS (Sept.
30, 2019), https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/aurora-beacon-news/ct-abn-montgomeryman-sentenced-to-prison-child-pornography-st-1001-20190930-da6e5t626ff67enhzw6l6cnbqistory.html [https://perma.cc/F9XR-N4FK] (explaining that the defendant used Kik to create chatrooms to share child sexual abuse imagery); but see, e.g., Kate Fazzini, Four Men Sentenced for
Child Pornography, DOJ Said They Used Bitcoin and Tor to Cover Their Tracks, CNBC (Aug. 12,
2019, 4:33 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/12/doj-sentences-four-for-child-porn-usedbitcoin-tor-to-cover-tracks.html [https://perma.cc/4YK9-C5BX] (reporting that the Justice Department said that the four men used “highly sophisticated” encryption technology to run an underground network of child pornography trafficking).
88. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 15–16; Binford, supra note 37, at 119.
In 2011, U.S. officials penetrated a child pornography ring that engaged in “horrific”
and “unspeakable” crimes involving the sexual exploitation of children, some of whom
were infants. This ring centered on a members-only online community called Dreamboard, which required prospective members to upload pornography of children under
twelve years of age. After being admitted to the community, participants had to continually upload child sexual abuse images, with greater access and higher statuses awarded
based on their “level of commitment to the enterprise.” Participants achieved the highest
level of membership by producing their own child pornography, with particular benefits
bestowed on members who caused the infants and children “obvious and . . . intentional
pain.” One area of the site mandated that the victims were “in distress and crying.”
The child pornography ring was truly an international affair. The global nature of the
Internet meant that U.S. law enforcement arrested not only members from various states,
but also required the cooperation from foreign officials to arrest offenders in “Canada,
Denmark, Ecuador, France, Germany, Hungary, Kenya, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Qatar, Serbia, Sweden, and Switzerland.”
Id. at 120 (internal citations omitted).
89. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 15–16 (explaining that secure collectors’ occupation of hidden levels of the internet gives them access to a wide range of images); see, e.g.,
Technological Level of Wonderland Network Shocked All Investigators, IRISH TIMES (Sept. 3,
1998), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/technological-level-of-wonderland-network-shocked-allinvestigators-1.189298 [https://perma.cc/R9AY-YN4R] (“Wonderland’s [a club of child pornography offenders] closed network on the Internet was protected by an extremely advanced security
system. Unconfirmed reports from the US claim that it used a code originally developed by the
KGB to encrypt all its communications.”).
90. Grooming, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/grooming [https://perma.cc/TJX8-D9SA] (last visited Oct. 21, 2020) (defining grooming as
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normalize sexual abuse and manipulate the children.91 Lastly, there are
physical abusers who record themselves abusing children as part of their
pedophiliac interest.92 They may or may not distribute the images or be
involved in online networks.93
The impact of viewing child sexual abuse imagery on offenders is
inconclusive.94 On one hand, some believe that the images help people
with pedophiliac compulsions avoid physically abusing minors.95 On the
other hand, child pornography can be used to groom and prepare children
for physical abuse.96 Furthermore, continuous viewing of child sexual
abuse imagery can desensitize offenders, leading to thirst for more

“the criminal activity of becoming friends with a child in order to try to persuade the child to have
a sexual relationship”); KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 22 (“By showing the child that others
have engaged in sexual contact, that they are seemingly enjoying the sexual contact, . . . the adult
offender grooms his victim by ‘educating’ him that such contact is normal and acceptable.”).
91. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 15–16 (elaborating that grooming involves direct abuse of children, which exposes them to greater risk of detection); Simmons, supra note 86
(explaining that “experts” manipulate victims and that the usage of child pornography to groom
potential victims is common in this subset of offenders).
92. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 16–17 (concluding that, in the case of physical
abusers, the possession of pornography is secondary to the evidence of abusive behavior it records);
see KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 24 (“[A]n exploiter armed with a digital camera that he
uses to take a picture of a naked minor displaying genitalia in a lewd and lascivious way is sufficient
to qualify for a ‘manufacture of child pornography’ charge.”).
93. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 16–17; see, e.g., DOJ CONGRESSIONAL
REPORT, supra note 72, at B-3 (explaining that a pedophile voiced his desire to sexually abuse a
minor, “especially if he could film or photograph the anticipated abuse”); see Child Pornography
Victim
Recovers
$93,532.57
in
Restitution,
JONES
DAY
(July
2019),
https://www.jonesday.com/en/practices/experience/2019/07/child-pornography-victim-recovers9353257-in-resti [https://perma.cc/HH7L-KY9P]. In United States v. Jones, the defendant was a
famous YouTuber who used Facebook Messenger and iMessage to contact young female fans. He
requested and received images of child pornography, but the images were never distributed. Id.
94. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 18–19 (explaining that while the effects of
pornography on users have been extensively researched, the results are contentious); Prichard et
al., supra note 13, at 586 (remarking that research was unclear on whether child sexual abuse imagery leads to higher instances of abuse or prevents hands-on abuse); Benedict Carey, Preying on
Children: The Emerging Psychology of Pedophiles, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/29/us/pedophiles-online-sex-abuse.html
[https://perma.cc/8CPA-W2UH]
(“The relationship between viewing or collecting images and committing hands-on abuse is a matter of continuing debate among some experts . . . .”).
95. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 18–19 (explaining that, for these users, viewing
child pornography is the only outlet for their sexual attraction to children); Jérôme Endrass et al.,
The Consumption of Internet Child Pornography and Violent and Sex Offending, 9 BMC
PSYCHIATRY 1, 1 (2009) (concluding that child pornography alone is not a risk factor for committing hands-on abuse).
96. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 18–19 (explaining that in this case, pornography is a by-product of pedophilia); KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 22 (“The offender uses
the pornography as a tool to lower the inhibitions of the minor and to prepare the minor for future
sexual contact. By showing the child that others have engaged in sexual contact, that they are seemingly enjoying the sexual contact, and that it has been captured for viewing, the adult offender
grooms his victim by ‘educating’ him that such contact is normal and acceptable.”).
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images and more grotesque content.97 Additionally, some research
suggests viewing child sexual abuse imagery may increase the chances
that a person will commit physical abuse of a minor.98 Nevertheless,
while it remains unclear whether viewing child sexual abuse imagery
leads to predatory sexual abuse, viewing child sexual abuse imagery itself
is an act of violence against the children depicted, whose abuse is
memorialized, circulated, and viewed by adults.
3. The Global Magnitude of the Child Sexual Abuse Imagery Industry
The global magnitude of the child sexual abuse imagery industry
creates two major problems. First, the prevalence outpaces law
enforcement’s capabilities to effectively prosecute these crimes.99
Second, the global industry facilitates the victimization of children
abroad and contributes to the rise of organized criminal syndicates
producing child sexual abuse imagery.100
Advances in technology facilitate the sexual exploitation of children at
home and abroad.101 The internet allows consumers from the United
States to obtain new material from producers in other countries.102
97. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 18–19 (explaining that pornography in this case
can have a corrosive effect); Carey, supra note 94 (“But the images and online communities can
help erode inhibitions further, drawing pedophiles into more frequent or more aggressive acts, Dr.
Bourke [chief of the behavioral analysis unit of the United States Marshals] said.”).
98. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 18–19; Tori DeAngelis, Porn Use and Child
Abuse: The Link May Be Greater Than We Think, a Controversial Study Suggests, 40 AM. PSYCH.
ASS’N 56, 56 (2009) (discussing a study where 85% of child pornography offenders admitted to
sexually molesting a child at least once).
99. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 25–27 (concluding that the decentralized structure of the internet makes control of child pornography difficult); KENDALL & FUNK, supra note
11, at 179 (explaining that although a child pornography bust led to a number of significant convictions, thousands of offenders were not fully investigated because of limited law enforcement
resources).
100. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 2 (“Local citizens may access child pornography images that were produced and/or stored in another city or on another continent.”); see generally KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 177–94 (describing the investigation and prosecution
of Dr. Watzman, a U.S. citizen who was a subscriber to Regpay, a child sexual abuse imagery
website, and would specially order videos customized to his preferential age and fantasies from a
Russian syndicate). Regpay received at least $2.5 million from membership fees for the websites
alone, and this was an “extremely conservative amount based on traceable purchases only.” Id. at
178, 473 n.2.
101. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 9 (explaining that images may be stored on
servers located almost anywhere in the world); KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 195 (“In the
context of child sexual exploitation, the inescapable contemporary truth is that commercial and
noncommercial exploiters alike satisfy a global demand by selling and trading sexually explicit
images of children, as well as the children themselves, across national borders as if they were guns
or narcotics (the other top-dollar commodities headlining the global black market).”).
102. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 9 (explaining that child pornography may be
uploaded to the internet on websites or exchanged via e-mail, instant messages, newsgroups, bulletin boards, chat rooms, and peer-to-peer networks); see KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 195
(noting that the internet allows users to access the child exploitation market more easily).
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Additionally, criminal organizations have recognized the profit within the
child sexual abuse imagery industry and have capitalized on it.103
Similarly, sexual tourism is intertwined with the child sexual abuse
imagery industry.104 Sexual tourism is when people visit developing,
poorer nations to engage in commercial sexual acts.105 Because offenders
can abuse children in foreign countries without facing the repercussions
that they would encounter in more developed countries,106 offenders
travel to foreign countries to abuse children and record that abuse.107
Furthermore, individuals in less developed countries can record abuse of
children to sell on the internet and profit from the demand in more
developed countries. Thus, the impact is twofold. First, sex tourists can
actually visit different countries to perpetrate abuse and record it. Second,
103. See generally KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 171–94 (explaining the investigation
of Regpay, a criminal syndicate based in Moscow that had a global network of subscribers to its
child pornography websites where offenders could order customized videos depicting the abuse of
children that met their individual preferences).
104. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-525, at 2 (2002) (“Many developing countries have fallen prey to
the serious problem of international sex tourism. According to the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children, child-sex tourism is a major component of the worldwide sexual exploitation
of children and is increasing. . . . Because poor countries are often under economic pressure to develop tourism, those governments often turn a blind eye toward this devastating problem because
of the income it produces.”); see, e.g., DOJ CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 72, at B-4 (detailing the case against Angel Mariscal, who was convicted of working with several co-conspirators
to produce videos of child sexual abuse, including made-to-order videos, and selling the videos for
as much as $975). In Mariscal, the defendant abused more than 150 children, mostly in Ecuador
and Cuba. Id.
105. COMBATING CHILD SEX TOURISM: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, ECPAT INTL. 6 (2008)
[hereinafter
ECPAT]
https://www.ecpat.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/cst_faq_eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HX3T-5ARR] (noting that sex tourists can be domestic as well as international);
see, e.g., Bill Smith, Florida Man Gets 330 Years on Child Porn Charges in “Sex Tourism” Trial,
USA TODAY (Apr. 22, 2018, 1:57 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nationnow/2018/04/22/florida-man-gets-330-years-child-porn-charges-sex-tourism-trial/540295002/
[https://perma.cc/FP97-EJ42] (reporting that the defendant visited the Philippines multiple times
from 2005–2016 to abuse prepubescent minors, record the abuse, and distribute the images online).
Furthermore, a “striking feature of child sex tourists . . . is the frequency with which they produce,
collect and exchange images of abuse. In many CST [child sex tourism] cases, the offending adult
films or records the abuse . . . . The offender may keep the images for his or her own consumption
or may share them with other child pornography consumers.” ECPAT, supra, at 21.
106. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-525, at 2–3 (2002) (“There would be no need for a sex tourism
statute if foreign countries successfully prosecuted U.S. citizens or resident aliens for the child sex
crimes committed within their borders. However, for reasons ranging from ineffective law enforcement, lack of resources, corruption, and generally immature legal systems, sex tourists often escape
prosecution in host countries.”); see also Najat Maalla M’jid (Special Rapporteur on the Sale of
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Sale
of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, 5, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/54 (Dec. 24, 2012)
(“As child protection laws, mechanisms and prevention efforts are strengthened by States, civil
society and the tourism industry in some countries, neighboring countries become obvious alternative destinations for travelling sex offenders.”).
107. H.R. REP. NO. 107-525, at 2–3 (2002) (noting the various factors that allow sex tourists to
avoid prosecution); see, e.g., Smith, supra note 105 (noting that the defendant made multiple trips
to the Philippines to sexually abuse minors without detection or prosecution).
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people in less developed countries can create the imagery themselves and
make a profit by selling it to the markets in more developed countries via
the internet.
C. Mandatory Restitution for Victims of Child Sexual Abuse Imagery
Restitution is a remedy based on the defendant’s unjust enrichment by
gaining something from another.108 Criminal restitution is imposed on
convicted offenders to make victims whole through reimbursement of the
victim’s losses caused by the criminal act.109 Restitution in criminal law
can be traced back to 1925, when restitution was imposed as a condition
of supervision.110 In 1982, Congress passed the Victim and Witness
Protection Act of 1982, which allowed courts to impose discretionary
restitution.111 In 1990, the Supreme Court held that restitution is only
allowable for losses caused by the specific conduct that is the basis for
the convicted offense.112 In the 1990s, Congress passed several acts
which expanded federal restitution, including restitution for failure to pay
child support, crimes against women and children, and telemarketing
crimes.113
The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 mandates that district
courts enter restitution orders for certain crimes.114 The Act applies to
several crimes, and 18 U.S.C. § 2259 directs that district courts shall enter
restitution orders to victims for the full amount of their losses.115 Section
108. Restitution, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (AM. L. INST. 2011) (“Liability in restitution derives
from the receipt of a benefit whose retention without a payment would result in the unjust enrichment of the defendant at the expense of the claimant.”).
109. Restitution, U.S. ATT’Y’S OFF. DIST. ALASKA, https://www.justice.gov/usao-ak/restitution
[https://perma.cc/UZB8-TCDW] (last visited Oct. 22, 2020); Restitution, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The set of remedies associated with that body of law, in which the
measure of recovery is . . . [c]ompensation for loss; esp. full or partial compensation paid by a
criminal to a victim, not awarded in a civil trial for tort, but ordered as part of a criminal sentence
or as a condition of probation.”).
110. Pub. L. No. 68-596, 43 Stat. 1260 (1925), repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987,
2031 (1987); Ashleigh Boe, Putting a Price on Child Porn: Requiring Defendants Who Possess
Child Pornography Images to Pay Restitution to Child Pornography Victims, 86 N.D. L. REV. 205,
209 (2010) (describing the first federal restitution act, the Federal Probation Act).
111. See Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663–3664) (providing that a court may order restitution in addition to other penalties).
112. See generally Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990).
113. Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-521, 106 Stat. 3403; Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796.
114. Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663–3664; Paroline v. United
States, 572 U.S. 434, 443 (2014) (noting that the statute states that courts “shall” order restitution).
115. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 464 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[S]ections 3663A and 3664 were
not designed specifically for child pornography offenses; they are a part of the Mandatory Victims
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2259 is enforced under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3664.116 Under § 3664, the government must demonstrate, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the amount of loss sustained by a victim
as a result of the offense committed by the defendant.117
Under § 2259, victims can recover costs incurred from medical
treatment, psychological and psychiatric care, physical therapy,
rehabilitation, necessary transportation, housing, childcare costs, lost
income, attorney fees, and any other costs incurred.118 In 2018, Congress
amended the portion of § 2259 dealing with restitution for child
pornography offenses, but these changes did not impact the costs that
victims can recover.119 The amendment to § 2259 changed how much a
victim can recover from individual defendants and is discussed in detail
in Section II.E.
D. The 1/n Calculation
Courts have struggled imposing restitution in child pornography cases
because of the causal requirement that restitution be ordered based on the
losses caused by the defendant’s offense and because there are likely
numerous offenders for each victim. In United States v. Gamble, a preParoline case, the Sixth Circuit devised a method of calculating
restitution amounts on which many courts have subsequently based their
orders.120 This formula calculates a restitution amount by dividing the
full amount of the victim’s demonstrated losses by the total number of
convicted offenders involving the victim’s images, including the
defendant at bar.121 The Sixth Circuit noted that district courts have wide
discretion in this matter and that depending on the number of defendants,
Restitution Act of 1996 and supply general restitution guidelines for many federal offenses.”); 18
U.S.C. § 2259 (stating that courts “shall” order restitution).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 2259 (noting that enforcement of the section should be under § 3664); Paroline, 572 U.S. at 443 (stating that § 3664 in turn provides that the burden of demonstrating the
amount of loss sustained by a victim is on the government).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e) (“Any dispute as to the proper amount or type of restitution shall be
resolved by the court by the preponderance of the evidence. The burden of demonstrating the
amount of the loss sustained by a victim as a result of the offense shall be on the attorney for the
Government.”); United States v. Safford, 1:17-CR-54, 2019 WL 4044038, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug.
15, 2019) (providing similarly that the government bears the burden of proving the amount of a
victim’s losses).
118. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(c)(2) (listing the various costs that victims can recover); Safford, 2019
WL 4044039, at *1 (describing similarly the costs included in the full amount of the victim’s losses
in § 2259).
119. 18 U.S.C. § 2259 (providing that the order of restitution shall direct the defendant to pay
the victim the full amount of the victim’s losses); see infra Section II.F.
120. United States v. Gamble, 709 F.3d 541, 543–45 (6th Cir. 2013) (explaining that one defendant pleaded guilty to possession and the other defendant pleaded guilty to receipt of child pornography).
121. Id. at 554–55.
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such discretion may not be appropriate.122 For instance, if only a couple
offenders have been convicted, using the formula would result in a
disproportionately large share of the losses. On the other hand, if
thousands of offenders are known, using the formula could result in a
token amount. Many district courts still consider the 1/n calculation when
setting restitution amounts, despite post-Gamble case law cautioning
otherwise.123
E. Paroline v. United States
In Paroline, the Supreme Court addressed the causation standard and
created a framework for formulating the amount of the restitution for
defendants convicted of child pornography offenses.124 This Section will
review the factual history leading to the Paroline case and then analyze
the Court’s ruling on the causation standard for § 2259 in the majority
and dissenting opinions.125 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Alito,
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan, authored the majority opinion. Chief
Justice Roberts wrote a dissenting opinion, which Justices Scalia and
Thomas joined. Justice Sotomayor also dissented in a separate opinion.
Before the Supreme Court decided Paroline, several circuit courts
were split on the issue of causation and setting an amount for restitution
under §§ 2259 and 3664. Ten circuits read in a proximate causation standard but based on different reasoning.126 The Fifth Circuit rejected the
122. Id. at 554 (“This second step [referring to the decision to use the 1/n calculation or a variation of it] provides district courts with considerable discretion.”); but see United States v. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d 1309, 1335 n.8 (11th Cir. 2019) (explaining that strict or sole reliance on the 1/n
calculation would not meet the muster of the Paroline framework).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Sainz, 827 F.3d 602, 605 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting that the government relied on the 1/n calculation); Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1314 (explaining that the government proposed a variation of the 1/n calculation); United States v. Bordman, 895 F.3d 1048, 1056
(8th Cir. 2018) (using the 1/n calculation); United States v. Campbell-Zorn, No. CR 14-41, 2014
WL 7215214, at *5 (D. Mont. Dec. 17, 2014) (discussing the application of the 1/n calculation
(citing United States v. Wencewicz, 2014 WL 5437057, at *3–5 (D. Mont. Oct. 24, 2014))).
124. Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 439 (2014) (“The question is what causal relationship must be established between the defendant’s conduct and a victim’s losses for purposes of
determining the right to, and the amount of, restitution under § 2259.”).
125. Infra Section II.E.4 (discussing the “relative role” standard and the Paroline factors); infra
Section II.E.5 (discussing the argument that the statute was unworkable); infra Section II.E.6 (discussing Justice Sotomayor’s proposal for joint and several liability).
126. United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1261–62 (9th Cir. 2011) (reading in a proximate
causation standard using principles of general statutory construction); United States v. McDaniel,
631 F.3d 1204, 1208–09 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that § 2259 limits recoverable losses to those
proximately caused by the defendant’s conduct); but see United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528,
535 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (basing the proximate causation standard in the “traditional principals of tort
and criminal law”); United States v. Burgess, 684 F.3d 445, 456–57 (4th Cir. 2012) (examining the
issue of proximate cause through the employment of a tort law principle in the construction of the
criminal statute); United States v. Aumais, 656 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2011) (endorsing the D.C.
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proximate causation standard and imposed joint and several liability.127
1. Factual Background
The defendant, Doyle Randall Paroline, pleaded guilty to one count of
possession of child pornography.128 He possessed between 150 and 300
images, several of which were images of the victim, Amy.129 Amy was
abused by her uncle, who recorded the assaults.130 Her images became
some of the most trafficked series of child sexual abuse imagery.131 Amy
received treatment and recovered from the trauma caused by her uncle’s
abuse in her early teenage years.132 However, when she was seventeen,
she was notified that the recordings of her abuse were being trafficked on
the internet.133 Knowing that thousands of people were viewing images

Circuit’s reasoning in Monzel); United States v. Benoit, 713 F.3d 1, 1 (10th Cir. 2013) (referring to
the court’s holding in Burgess); see United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645, 658–59 (6th Cir. 2012)
(acknowledging the different rationales for reading in a proximate causation standard but stating
that “[w]e need not choose between the rationales”); United States v. Kearney, 672 F.3d 81, 94–98
(1st Cir. 2012) (imposing a proximate causation standard based on the aggregate result of the actions of the offenders); United States v. Fast, 709 F.3d 712, 721–22 (8th Cir. 2013) (finding that no
courts’ reasoning is absolute, but similarly concluding that proximate cause is required); United
States v. Laraneta, 700 F.3d 983, 990–92 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that there was a proximate causation standard which imposed joint and several liability on producers and distributors but not for
possessors).
127. In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749, 765, 769 (5th Cir. 2012) (“We cannot read the ‘proximate result’ language in § 2259(b)(3)(F) as applying to the categories of losses in § 2259(b)(3)(A)–
(E).The joint and several liability mechanism applies well in these circumstances, where victims
like Amy are harmed by defendants acting separately who have caused her a single harm.”), rev’d
sub nom. Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014); James R. Marsh, Federal Criminal Restitution for Child Pornography Victims, 17 CHILD. RTS. LITIG. 12, 13 (2014) (explaining that at
least three circuits agree that under rules of statutory construction, the “proximate result” language
cannot be read to apply to the categories of losses listed in § 2259(b)(3)).
128. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 439; Cassell & Marsh, supra note 18, at 3.
129. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 439 (“He admitted to possessing between 150 and 300 images of
child pornography, which included two that depicted the sexual exploitation of a young girl, now a
young woman, who goes by the pseudonym ‘Amy’ for this litigation.”); Cassell & Marsh, supra
note 18, at 3 (explaining that nine years after Amy’s abuse ended, Paroline downloaded images of
Amy).
130. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 440 (“When she was eight and nine years old, she was sexually
abused by her uncle in order to produce child pornography.”); Lorelei Laird, Pricing Amy, A.B.A.
J., Sept. 2012, at 48, 51 (“Amy recalls telling him the penetration hurt, but it kept happening. And
like most child victims, she trusted him when he told her it was a normal thing adults do with
children, that he loved her and that it was their special secret . . . .”).
131. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 440 (explaining that her images were available worldwide, and that
there were “easily” thousands of possessors); Laird, supra note 130, at 51.
132. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 440 (stating that she underwent therapy for two years and by the end,
she was “back to normal”); Cassell & Marsh, supra note 18, at 2.
133. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 440 (explaining that a major setback in her recovery came when she
was notified that her images were being trafficked on the internet); Cassell & Marsh, supra note
18, at 2.
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of her abuse triggered Amy to relapse.134 In a victim impact statement,
she explained that the circulation made her feel like she was being abused
again and again.135
Amy sought restitution under § 2259 for $3 million.136 The parties
stipulated that the victim did not know Paroline and that her losses did
not derive from knowledge about his specific conduct.137 The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit both denied relief.138 After
a rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that § 2259 does
not limit restitution to harms proximately caused by the defendant. The
court ordered Paroline to pay the full amount of Amy’s losses.139
2. The Causation Issue
The Court needed to decide two major issues on appeal in Paroline.
The first issue the Court considered was the causation standard for
§ 2259. The Supreme Court explained that § 2259 mandates restitution
for offenses involving the sexual exploitation of children, including child
pornography.140 Moreover, § 2259 directs enforcement under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3664.141 Section 3664 requires that the government prove the losses
sustained by the victim result from the defendant’s specific offense.142

134. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 440–41 (quoting Amy’s victim impact statement where she explains
that the images make her feel humiliated and powerless); Laird, supra note 130, at 51.
135. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 441 (“It’s like I am being abused over and over and over again.”);
see also Laird, supra note 130, at 51.
136. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 441 (stating that Amy requested $3.4 million for lost income and
future treatment costs); Laird, supra note 130, at 51 (noting that Amy has suffered significant
trauma because of the magnitude of the circulation—it took two days to open all of the victim
notification letters from 2006–2007).
137. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 442 (“They stipulated that the victim did not know who Paroline was
and that none of her claimed losses flowed from any specific knowledge about him or his offense
conduct.”); Cassell & Marsh, supra note 18, at 3 (noting that the district court denied restitution
because Amy could not prove that Paroline was responsible for her specific harm).
138. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 442 (denying relief because the government did not prove Amy’s
losses were “directly produced by Paroline”).
139. Id. at 442–43 (remarking that in an en banc hearing, the Fifth Circuit held that § 2259 did
not limit the restitution to losses proximately caused by the defendant and imposed joint and several
liability on defendants); Cassell & Marsh, supra note 18, at 3–4 (noting that the Supreme Court
granted Paroline’s petition for certiorari).
140. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 443 (explaining that § 2259 mandates restitution for offenses involving sexual exploitation of children and child pornography); United States v. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d
1309, 1324 (11th Cir. 2019) (explaining the background of § 2259 in child pornography cases).
141. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 443 (“Section 2259(b)(2) provides that ‘[a]n order of restitution under this section shall be issued and enforced in accordance with section 3664’ . . . .”); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2259(b)(2).
142. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 443; 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e) (“The burden of demonstrating the amount
of the loss sustained by a victim as a result of the offense shall be on the attorney for the Government.”).
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Lower courts were split on what causation the government would have to
prove: but-for or proximate causation.143
The Supreme Court first confronted the complications arising from
but-for causation, which requires proof one event caused another
event.144 The Court noted that but-for causation cannot be proven in the
typical child pornography restitution case because the defendant is one of
an unknowable number of people possessing and distributing the
images.145 The victim does not know the specific defendants, and she is
still harmed even if the individual defendant had not committed the
offense.146 Simply put, but for the defendant’s actions, the victim still
would have suffered.147 The Court explained that proximate causation,
on the other hand, only requires proof that there is a sufficient connection
between the defendant’s conduct and the victim’s losses.148 A
defendant’s possession or distribution of a victim’s images is sufficiently
connected to the victim’s losses because it is foreseeable that a victim
would be harmed by the circulation of images depicting the victim’s

143. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 443–44 (citing In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749, 752 (5th Cir.
2012); United States v. Rogers, 714 F.3d 82, 89 (1st Cir. 2013); United States v. Benoit, 713 F.3d
1, 20 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Fast, 709 F.3d 712, 721–22 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v.
Laraneta, 700 F.3d 983, 989–90 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Burgess, 684 F.3d 445, 456–57
(4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645, 659 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Aumais,
656 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1261 (9th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 535 (D.C. Cir. 2011); United States v. McDaniel, 631 F.3d
1204, 1208–09 (11th Cir. 2011)).
144. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 449–50 (“The traditional way to prove that one event was a factual
cause of another is to show that the latter would not have occurred ‘but for’ the former.”); Cassell
& Marsh, supra note 18, at 4 (explaining that Justice Kennedy acknowledged the various tort principles implicated in the causation issue and, for complicated reasons, concluded that proximate
causation should be applied).
145. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 450 (explaining that but-for causation could be proven with producers or initial distributors of child pornography but not possessors); Cassell & Marsh, supra note 18,
at 4 (noting that Justice Kennedy concluded that it would not be possible to prove but-for causation).
146. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 450 (“From the victim’s perspective, Paroline was just one of thousands of anonymous possessors.”); Laird, supra note 130, at 51 (explaining that she feared the
public because people might recognize her from the images depicting her childhood rapes).
147. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 450 (“But it is not possible to prove that her losses would be less
(and by how much) but for one possessor’s individual role in the large, loosely connected network
through which her images circulate.”); Laird, supra note 130, at 52 (explaining that before the
Supreme Court decided Paroline, legal experts said there was “no precedent for these questions
under VAWA or anywhere else in criminal or in tort law”).
148. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 451–52 (explaining that legal fictions have been created to allow for
liability when the efforts of independent actors cause a combined result).
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sexual abuse.149 The Court thus held that proximate causation is the more
appropriate standard for § 2259.150
3. The “Relative Role in the Causal Process”
The Court then considered how courts should calculate an amount of
restitution. The Court held that proximate causation can be used to justify
imposing some restitution award but that it does not justify imposing joint
and several liability.151 The Court noted that offenders of child
pornography, by and large, do not act in concert or within a joint
enterprise.152 By adopting joint and several liability, the Court would
make an individual possessor liable for “the combined consequences” of
the acts of potentially tens of thousands of people.153 The Court
concluded that joint and several liability would be unjust because a single
offender could be liable for the full harm caused by all offenders, even if
the offender played a relatively insignificant role in causing the harm.154
The Supreme Court reasoned that it was both unjust to deny any
restitution to victims as well as unjust to order restitution for victims in
the full amount of their losses.155 But, Congress made its intent clear:
victims were entitled to full compensation for their losses. The Court held
that defendants are liable for their “relative role in the causal process that
underlies the victim’s general losses” that is not “a token or nominal
amount.”156 In entering a restitution amount, district courts should not
149. Id. at 456–57 (explaining that Paroline was a cause of Amy’s harm, and that it was indisputable that his actions caused her harm, even though no one could determine how much harm he
caused).
150. Id. at 458 (“It would be unacceptable to adopt a causal standard so strict that it would
undermine congressional intent where neither the plain text of the statute nor legal tradition demands such an approach.”).
151. Id. at 455–56 (explaining that joint and several liability without a practical method of contribution could implicate the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 22 (AM. L. INST. 2000) (imposing joint and
several liability on intentional torts for any indivisible injury caused by the tortious conduct); id.
§ 10 (“When, under applicable law, some persons are jointly and severally liable to an injured person, the injured person may sue for and recover the full amount of recoverable damages from any
jointly and severally liable person.”).
152. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 454 (“[T]his case does not involve a set of wrongdoers acting in
concert, . . . for Paroline had no contact with the overwhelming majority of the offenders . . . .”).
153. Id. (“[A]doping the victim’s approach would make an individual possessor liable for the
combined consequences of the acts of not just 2, 5, or even 100 independently acting offenders; but
instead, a number that may reach into the tens of thousands.”).
154. Id. at 455 (explaining that holding a possessor liable for the full amount of the victim’s
losses could be grossly excessive under the Eighth Amendment); but see Cassell & Marsh, supra
note 18, at 13 (disagreeing with the Supreme Court in Paroline’s characterization of the Eighth
Amendment in dicta).
155. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 457 (“[I]t would produce anomalous results to say that no restitution
is appropriate in these circumstances.”).
156. Id. at 458–59.
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rely on a “precise algorithm.”157 The Court directed district courts to
assess the individual’s contribution to the underlying causal process “as
best [they] can.”158 The Court then announced several factors courts
ordering restitution should use as guideposts when formulating an
amount for restitution, including
the number of past criminal defendants found to have contributed to the
victim’s general losses; reasonable predictions of the number of future
offenders likely to be caught and convicted for crimes contributing to
the victim’s general losses; any available and reasonably reliable
estimate of the broader number of offenders involved (most of whom
will, of course, never be caught or convicted); whether the defendant
reproduced or distributed images to the victim; whether the defendant
had any connection to the initial production of the images; how many
images of the victim the defendant possessed; and other facts relevant
to the defendant’s relative causal role.159

4. Criticism of the Impossible Statutory Construction
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissented
and objected to the majority’s interpretation of § 2259, arguing that the
majority overstepped its authority by rewriting the statute that Congress
enacted.160 The Chief Justice argued that Congress enacted an
unworkable standard because Congress failed to tailor it to the unique
harm caused by child sexual abuse imagery.161
The Chief Justice reasoned that the statute required but-for causation,
disagreeing with both the majority opinion and Justice Sotomayor’s
157. Id. at 459–60.
158. Id. at 459.
159. Id. at 460 (listing various factors for courts to consider, which are often referred to as the
“Paroline factors”).
160. Id. at 463 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The Court attempts to design a more coherent restitution system, focusing on ‘the defendant’s relative role in the causal process that underlies the
victim’s general losses.’ But this inquiry, sensible as it may be, is not the one Congress adopted.”);
id. (“Instead of tailoring the statute to the unique harms caused by child pornography, Congress
borrowed a generic restitution standard that makes restitution contingent on the Government’s ability to prove, ‘by the preponderance of the evidence,’ ‘the amount of the loss sustained by a victim
as a result of’ the defendant’s crime.”).
161. Id. at 464 (“It provides that ‘[a]n order of restitution under this section shall be issued and
enforced in accordance with section 3664 in the same manner as an order under section 3663A.’
Unlike section 2259, sections 3663A and 3664 were not designed specifically for child pornography offenses; they are part of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 and supply general
restitution guidelines for many federal offenses.”); id. at 467–68 (“The problem stems from the
nature of Amy’s injury. . . . The section 3664(e) standard will work just fine for most crime victims,
because it will usually not be difficult to identify the harm caused by the defendant’s offense. . . .
Amy has a qualitatively different injury. Her loss, while undoubtably genuine, is a result of the
collective actions of a huge number of people—beginning with her uncle who abused her and put
her images on the Internet, to the distributors who make those images more widely available, to the
possessors such as Paroline who view her images.”).
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dissent which found that only proximate causation was required.162 He
explained that the government needed to prove the actual amount of harm
that Amy suffered as a result of Paroline’s actions.163 However, he noted
that the government could never prove this because Amy did not know
that Paroline possessed her images. Rather, her harm derived from the
knowledge that thousands of people were viewing and distributing her
images.164
Chief Justice Roberts noted the Court’s holding in Paroline directs
district courts to “look at what other courts have done.”165 He explained
that a district court would have to “assess as best it can from available
evidence the significance of the individual defendant’s conduct in light
of the broader causal process that produced the victim’s losses.”166
However, he asserted that the statute actually requires a district court to
impose a restitution order that reflects the harm that the defendant
caused—not the defendant’s relative culpability.167
The Chief Justice found that the system created by the Court was
inequitable to both victims and defendants.168 He concluded the Court
should have denied restitution. This would have forced Congress to enact
a workable statute for victims of child pornography instead of creating a
standard that can only be arbitrarily applied to defendants and can only
162. Id. at 465 (citing Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 210 (2014) (holding that the
ordinary meaning of “results from” requires proof of actual causation)); see Hughey v. United
States, 495 U.S. 411, 418–19 (1990) (requiring the restitution order reflect the loss caused by the
offense of the conviction).
163. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 466 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The offense of conviction here was
Paroline’s possession of two of Amy’s images. No one suggests Paroline’s crime actually caused
Amy to suffer millions of dollars in losses . . . . Determining what amount the statute does allow—
the amount of Amy’s losses that Paroline’s offense caused—is the real difficulty of this case.”).
164. Id. at 468 (“Amy’s injury is indivisible, which means that Paroline’s particular share of
her losses is unknowable. And yet it is proof of Paroline’s particular share that the statute requires.”); id. at 467–68 (“The problem stems from the nature of Amy’s injury. . . . The section
3664(e) standard will work just fine for most crime victims, because it will usually not be difficult
to identify the harm caused by the defendant’s offense. . . . Amy has a qualitatively different injury.
Her loss, while undoubtably genuine, is the result of the collective actions of a huge number of
people—beginning with her uncle who abused her and put her images on the Internet, to the distributors who make those images more widely available, to the possessors such as Paroline who
view her images.”); see also id. at 466 (rejecting Justice Sotomayor’s argument in favor of imposing
joint and several liability because §§ 3663A and 3664 require that the restitution order be reflective
of the losses caused by the defendant’s offenses).
165. Id. at 469 (commenting that the standard imposed by the majority allows district courts to
impose the “going rate” of restitution orders instead of ordering a restitution order that is reflective
of the harm actually caused by the defendant).
166. Id. at 470 (citing id. at 459 (majority opinion)).
167. Id. (“The majority’s plan to situate Paroline along a spectrum of offenders who have contributed to Amy’s harm will not assist a district court in calculating the amount of Amy’s losses . . .
that was caused by Paroline’s crime (or that of any other defendant).”).
168. Id. (commenting that victims would have to litigate for years to recover small restitution
awards from various defendants).
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grant piecemeal recovery to victims.169 In actuality, the Court left the
public with the view that the decision was a win for victims and Congress
had done enough for victims, even though the decision was riddled with
complications and difficulties.170
5. A Proposal for Joint and Several Liability
Writing alone, Justice Sotomayor dissented and interpreted § 2259 as
allowing joint and several liability on all defendants convicted of child
offenses related to a victim’s images.171She noted that Congress enacted
§ 2259 and the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 within the
legal background of tort principles, which indicated that Congress
intended that victims receive full restitution through joint and several
liability.172 Justice Sotomayor concluded that the majority’s
interpretation flouted congressional intent. Despite the directive to grant
restitution reflecting the full amount of the victim’s losses, victims are no
longer guaranteed full recovery because individual defendants are only
responsible for their “relative role” in causing the victim’s losses.173
Justice Sotomayor argued that joint and several liability is appropriate
in the context of child pornography offenses.174 Possessors, distributors,
and producers are involved in a global industry based on the sexual
exploitation of children.175 She noted that possessors do not play a
passive role in the industry. Rather, possessors are “an integral part of the
‘market for the sexual exploitative use of children.’”176 Without
consumers in the market, such as possessors like Paroline, the industry
would not flourish.177
Justice Sotomayor concluded that the lack of a cause of action for
contribution was not dispositive against reading in joint and several
169. Id. at 471 (“Amy will fare no better if district courts consider the other factors suggested
by the majority . . . .”).
170. Id. at 471–72 (“[I]t would be a mistake for that salutary outcome to lead readers to conclude
that Amy has prevailed or that Congress has done justice for victims of child pornography. The
statute as written allows no recovery; we ought to say so, and give Congress a chance to fix it.”).
171. Id. at 473 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“I would accordingly affirm the Fifth Circuit’s holding that the District Court must enter a restitution order reflecting the full amount of [Amy’s] losses
and instruct the court to consider a periodic payment schedule on remand.” (internal quotations
omitted)).
172. Id. at 482 (“Second, Congress adopted § 2259 against the backdrop of the rule governing
concerted action by joint tortfeasors . . . .”).
173. Id. at 472.
174. Id. at 483 (noting that child pornography offenders would amount to tort liability through
intentional invasion of privacy).
175. Id. (explaining that offenders act with the “common purpose of trafficking in images of
child sexual abuse”).
176. Id. (“As Congress itself recognized, ‘possessors of such material’ are an integral part of
the ‘market for the sexual exploitative use of children.’” (quoting § 2251 Findings (12)).
177. Id. (explaining that possessors “fuel the process” of the industry).
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liability.178 Contribution allows defendants who have been held jointly
and severally liable to seek money from other defendants who contributed
to the victim’s injuries.179 She determined that allowing for contribution
under the statute would congest courts with litigation. 180 Countering the
argument that individual defendants will be forced to pay an unfair share
of the restitution orders, she explained that § 3664 allows payment of
restitution orders through periodic payment schedules.181 When making
these payment schedules, district courts must consider the defendant’s
financial resources and obligations and can look to the substantial case
law on the topic for guidance.182
Justice Sotomayor proposed that partial periodic payments alleviate
concerns that joint and several liability would be unfair to defendants.183
A defendant ordered to pay the restitution order through a periodic
payment schedule would contribute smaller amounts of money over a
specified period of time at specified intervals.184 Defendants would all
pitch into the restitution until the victim recovers the full amount of her
established losses.185 When the sum of the defendants’ payments satisfies
the victim’s restitution order, all of the orders terminate.186

178. Id. at 485 (“I agree that the statute does not create a cause of action for contribution, but
unlike the majority I do not think the absence of contribution suggests that Congress intended the
phrase ‘full amount of the victim’s losses’ to mean something less than that.”).
179. Id. at 484–85 (discussing why the majority noted the lack of contribution was important,
as contribution allows defendants held joint and severally liable to seek money from other defendants).
180. Id. at 485 (“For instead of expending judicial resources on disputes between intentional
tortfeasors, Congress crafted a different mechanism for preventing inequitable treatment of individual defendants—the use of periodic payment schedules.”).
181. Id. (explaining that § 3664 allows for periodic payment schedules and that there is already
“a robust body of case law clarifying how payment schedules are to be set”).
182. Id. at 485–86 (citing various cases which reversed district courts’ payment schedules where
a defendant would not be able to pay the amount set).
183. Id. at 486 (“[P]artial periodic payments thus alleviate[] any concerns of unfairness . . . .”).
184. Id. at 486–87 (explaining that the restitution payments would be offset by all of the other
offenders’ payments).
185. Id. at 487 (noting that this system would provide victims certainty that they could recover
the full amount of their losses).
186. Id. at 486–87 (explaining how the system would operate).
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F. The Process for Receiving Restitution187
Under the current victims’ rights statutes, victims have the right to be
notified about prosecution involving the people who have harmed them
and to participate in those proceedings.188 Generally, the government, the
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, and law
enforcement work together to identify the victim189 and provide her with
notice.190 Then, the victim or the victim’s representative will send the
government a restitution request with the documentation corroborating
that amount.191 Once the victim submits the request, the government
chooses to support that request or to request a different amount.192 The
defendant can accept the request, negotiate with the government and
victim’s attorney, or challenge the request in the district court.193 Finally,
the district court sets a restitution order after considering the evidence and
weighing the Paroline factors.194
Because defendants are only liable for their “relative role,” if the
victim wants to recover the full amount of her demonstrated losses, the

187. This Comment does not explore the practical difficulties in recovering restitution, such as
ensuring that restitution is requested by the government, or the ability to collect restitution. See,
e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-203, FEDERAL CRIMINAL RESTITUTION: MOST
DEBT IS OUTSTANDING AND OVERSIGHT OF COLLECTIONS COULD BE IMPROVED (2018),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/689830.pdf [http://perma.cc/A2MA-KKWT]. Those problems,
however, are equally important. With a simpler legal standard and awareness, hopefully the government and victims request restitution more frequently.
188. United States v. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d 1309, 1314 (11th Cir. 2019) (explaining the typical
process for providing child pornography victims with mandatory restitution).
189. Id. (explaining the typical process of restitution requests pursuant to current victims’ rights
statutes); see also KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 252 (explaining that victims of sexual exploitation are entitled to restitution).
190. Victims have the option of refusing notice if they choose to do so. See KENDALL & FUNK,
supra note 11, at 249 (explaining that the Crime Victims’ Rights Act accords victims a recognized
role in court proceedings); see generally Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (explaining
that victims have enumerated rights).
191. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1314; see Reid & Collier, supra note 21, at 694 (explaining that
victims are in a better position to apportion losses).
192. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1314 (detailing the steps taken by the government in the restitution
proceedings).
193. Id.; see also Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 470 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(“Amy will be stuck litigating for years to come.”).
194. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1314 (providing an example of the Paroline factors at work); see
also United States v. Dillard, 891 F.3d 151, 161 (4th Cir. 2018) (“The district court was not faced
with a binary choice of accepting or rejecting the Government’s proposed calculation of an appropriate amount of restitution for each . . . victim. If the district court thought the . . . awards were too
high . . . , it should have adjusted the amount and explained its reasoning rather than refusing to
order any amount of restitution.”).
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victim must repeat this process for each offender until the sum of the
individual defendants’ restitution orders satisfies that full amount.195
III. DISCUSSION
Since the Supreme Court announced the Paroline framework, lower
courts have applied the standard differently.196 Several of the federal
courts of appeals are split on whether courts must first separate the harm
caused by the initial abuser before setting a restitution amount for
subsequent distributors and possessors.197 Courts commonly refer to this
separation as disaggregation.198
A. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits more or less hold that some level of
disaggregation is needed in calculating a restitution; however, there are
notable differences between the two circuits. In both United States v.
Dunn in the Tenth Circuit and United States v. Galan in the Ninth Circuit,
the defendants were convicted of distribution and possession of child
pornography.199 The defendants were each ordered to pay restitution to
their respective victims.200 In Dunn, the district court held the defendant
jointly and severally liable for Vicky’s remaining losses.201 Conversely,
in Galan, the district court entered a restitution order without
disaggregating the losses caused by the initial abuse from the losses
195. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1314 (explaining Paroline’s holding regarding damages and a
defendant’s “relative role” in child pornography cases).
196. Compare United States v. Dunn, 777 F.3d 1171, 1182 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding that there
is a disaggregation requirement), with United States v. Sainz, 827 F.3d 602, 609 (7th Cir. 2016)
(avoiding consideration of the disaggregation issue), and United States v. Halverson, 897 F.3d 645,
653–54 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding that a disaggregation requirement is inconsistent with the flexible
Paroline framework).
197. Compare Dunn, 777 F.3d at 1181 (concluding that there is a disaggregation requirement
because defendants are only supposed to be liable for the amount of harm that their conduct caused),
and United States v. Galan, 804 F.3d 1287, 1290–91 (9th Cir. 2015) (adopting the holding articulated in Dunn and requiring disaggregation), with Halverson, 897 F.3d at 654–55 n.4 (concluding
that the Paroline guideposts do not require a formal disaggregation), and United States v. Bordman,
895 F.3d 1048, 1051 (8th Cir. 2018) (concluding that disaggregation is not required because the
guideposts were created to be flexible and the district courts already have to consider whether the
defendant was the producer, distributor, or possessor).
198. See Dunn, 777 F.3d at 1181 (referring to the separation between harm caused by an initial
abuser and harm caused by subsequent distributors and possessors as disaggregation); see also Galan, 804 F.3d at 1291 (discussing disaggregation).
199. Dunn, 777 F.3d at 1172–73 (explaining that the defendant traded child sexual abuse imagery through peer-to-peer networks); Galan, 804 F.3d at 1288 (stating that the defendant possessed images of Cindy’s physical sexual abuse, which had ended eleven years prior to his offense).
200. Dunn, 777 F.3d at 1173 (stating that the defendant appealed his restitution order); Galan,
804 F.3d at 1288 (stating that the defendant appealed his restitution order).
201. Dunn, 777 F.3d at 1174 (noting that the restitution order amounted to $583,955 for Vicky
which represented the full amount of her unpaid aggregate losses).
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caused by the defendant’s actions.202
Applying Paroline, the Tenth Circuit in Dunn concluded that making
subsequent offenders liable for losses caused by the initial physical sexual
abuse through joint and several liability was “inconsistent with ‘the
bedrock principle that restitution should reflect the consequences of the
defendant’s own conduct.’”203 The defendant, Dunn, was only a
distributor for certain images; he had no involvement in the initial
physical abuse or production of those images. Moreover, he was one of
the thousands of others who possessed images of Vicky.204 Holding him
jointly and severally liable for the full amount does not reflect the loss
that “he individually has caused.”205 However, the Tenth Circuit did not
clarify if disaggregation was required for every case involving
subsequent distributors and possessors of child pornography.206
Similarly, in Galan, the Ninth Circuit noted the difficulties in applying
the restitution standard, but ultimately imposed a disaggregation
requirement.207 The Ninth Circuit held that when calculating the
restitution amount for distributors and possessors, district courts should
disaggregate “losses, including ongoing losses, caused by the original
202. Galan, 804 F.3d at 1289 n.5 (“The district court declared that ‘until the Ninth Circuit or
the Supreme Court mandates the “disaggregation” of harm and/or losses caused by the underlying
sexual abuse of child pornography victims, I will not require the government to do so when seeking
restitution.’”).
203. Dunn, 777 F.3d at 1181; see id. at 1179 (explaining the defendant’s argument regarding
restitution and how the court ruled); see also Rothenberg Petition for Certiorari, supra note 28, at
8 (“This award, the Tenth Circuit easily recognized, ‘cannot stand in light of Paroline’ because it
rendered the defendant liable for the conduct of other offenders . . . .”).
204. Dunn, 777 F.3d at 1179 (noting the District Court improperly applied Paroline because the
defendant was only a distributor); see Rothenberg Petition for Certiorari, supra note 28, at 9 (noting
that it would be inconsistent with the principles of Paroline to hold the defendant accountable for
harms caused by Vicky’s initial abuser).
205. Dunn, 777 F.3d at 1181 (explaining that the previous restitution amount held the defendant
responsible for not only his actions, but the actions of thousands of temporally distant offenders);
Rothenberg Petition for Certiorari, supra note 28, at 8 (“This award . . . rendered the defendant
liable for the conduct of other offenders, ‘in contravention of Paroline’s guidance.’”).
206. Dunn, 777 F.3d at 1181 (focusing on the defendant’s particular situation and not stating
that disaggregation is applicable to every case); see also United States v. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d
1309, 1333 (11th Cir. 2019) (“We read Dunn as requiring disaggregation in that case because the
defendant was held jointly and severally liable with the abuser for the entirety of the losses; we do
not read Dunn as requiring disaggregation in each and every restitution case.”); but see Rothenberg
Petition for Certiorari, supra note 28, at 8–9 (stating that the Tenth Circuit requires disaggregation).
207. See, e.g., United States v. Galan, 804 F.3d 1287, 1289–90 (9th Cir. 2015) (“While Congress could and should have made determination of the amount to which a victim is entitled a simple
matter, it regrettably did not.” (citing Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 463 (2014) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting))); see also United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1266 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting
that identifying a method for imposing restitution on defendants convicted of possession, receipt,
or transportation offenses is not easy); see also Galan, 804 F.3d at 1291 (“We have no illusion that
the task [of disaggregating the initial abuse] will be easy, but it does not appear any more impossible
than the other tasks [referring to apportioning restitution based on the other Paroline factors] imposed upon courts attempting to apportion restitution amounts in this area.”).
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abuse of the victim” from “the losses caused by the ongoing distribution
and possession of images.”208 The court did not give a particular portion
that should be attributable to the initial abuser, but stated that it does not
need to be precise.209 The court reasoned that even if the images were
never created, the victim would have suffered losses from the initial
abuse.210 Because the losses caused by the ongoing circulation of the
images do not cause all of the victim’s ongoing losses and because the
restitution amount should reflect the losses caused by the defendant’s
individual actions, the court determined that possessors and distributors
should not be liable for the losses caused by the initial abuse.211
B. The Seventh and Fourth Circuits
The Seventh and Fourth Circuits are worth discussing because both
courts focused on maintaining the flexibility of the Paroline
framework.212 They did not rule on whether disaggregation was required;
instead, the courts emphasized the wide discretion that district courts
have in setting an amount of restitution.213
In United States v. Sainz and United States v. Dillard, the defendants
were convicted of child pornography offenses.214 In both lower court

208. Galan, 804 F.3d at 1291 (holding disaggregation was required); Rothenberg Petition for
Certiorari, supra note 28, at 9–10 (noting that disaggregation was required because the Supreme
Court recognized the difference between original abusers and subsequent distributors and possessors).
209. Galan, 804 F.3d at 1291 (noting that precision is neither expected nor required); Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Galan, 804 F.3d at 1291).
210. Galan, 804 F.3d at 1290–91 (applying the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in Dunn); see Rothenberg Petition for Certiorari, supra note 28, at 10 (stating that it was “logical” to disaggregate the
losses caused by the initial abuse from the losses caused by the circulation of the images).
211. Galan, 804 F.3d at 1290–91 (concluding original abusers should be treated differently than
possessors and distributors); Rothenberg Petition for Certiorari, supra note 28, at 10 (remarking
that the consequences of the initial abuse and the consequences of the distribution of the images
cause horrible, but separate harms).
212. See United States v. Sainz, 827 F.3d 602, 607 (7th Cir. 2016) (emphasizing the flexibility
of the Paroline framework); see also United States v. Dillard, 891 F.3d 151, 162 (4th Cir. 2018)
(reversing the district court’s denial of restitution to noncontact victims even though the district
court concluded that the government had proven the harm caused by the defendant); cf. Rothenberg,
923 F.3d at 1330 (noting Paroline is a flexible standard that does not require a ruling on every
single factor).
213. See Sainz, 827 F.3d at 607 (approving the district court’s conclusion because it set a reasonable restitution amount); see also Dillard, 891 F.3d at 160 (stating that the district court only
needs to consider the Paroline factors when setting a restitution amount).
214. Sainz, 827 F.3d at 604 (stating that the defendant pleaded guilty to possessing thousands
of images of child sexual abuse imagery, which included six images of Cindy); Dillard, 891 F.3d
at 154 (stating that the defendant was convicted of multiple counts of sexual exploitation of a minor
and distribution of child pornography). Dillard was a part of a website which gave members access
to child sexual abuse imagery. To maintain membership, Dillard had to post at least one new image
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proceedings, the district courts considered the 1/n calculation in their
orders.215 In Sainz, the district court set a restitution order using the 1/n
method;216 whereas in Dillard, the district court rejected the
government’s proposed 1/n calculation and denied restitution to the
victims of the child sexual abuse imagery that the defendant possessed.217
In Sainz, the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s restitution
order because the 1/n method accounted for the number of past criminal
defendants who had contributed to the victim’s losses, which is one of
the Paroline factors.218 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the “bottom
line here is that the amount of the award is substantively reasonable,”
“neither severe nor trivial.”219 The circuit court rejected the defendant’s
argument that the district court erred by not considering each of the
Paroline factors when using the 1/n calculation.220 Rather, the court
viewed the Paroline factors as flexible guideposts which gave district
courts discretion in weighing certain factors as opposed to others.221 As
a result of this interpretation of Paroline, the Seventh Circuit avoided the
disaggregation argument based on Sainz’s connection to the production
of the images.222
Comparatively in Dillard, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district
court’s denial of restitution for the victims in the images that the
defendant possessed.223 In response to the district court’s conclusion that
the 1/n calculation was inappropriate because the formula is no more than
of child sexual abuse imagery to the website each month. He maintained his membership by sexually abusing a five-year-old minor. Additionally, he accessed other websites and social networking
apps to view, download, and upload sexual abuse imagery. Id.
215. Sainz, 827 F.3d at 605 (using the formula created by Gamble); Dillard, 891 F.3d at 155–
56 (stating that the government requested restitution amounts based on the 1/n method). One of the
victims requested double the amount of restitution calculated using the 1/n formula because the
amount of the 1/n calculation was less than one percent of her losses. Id. at 156.
216. Sainz, 827 F.3d at 605; Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1331.
217. Dillard, 891 F.3d at 156 (explaining that the district court found that the government had
not proven causation because there was no evidence that the victims were aware of the defendant’s
conduct and that the 1/n calculation was a “stab in the dark” for setting an amount for restitution);
Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1330 (“The district court denied all restitution to the non-contact victims
because the record contained no evidence that the victims were aware Dillard had their images . . . .”).
218. Sainz, 827 F.3d at 606; Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1330.
219. Sainz, 827 F.3d at 606; Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1331.
220. Sainz, 827 F.3d at 606; Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1331 (“Paroline does not require ‘district
courts to consider in every case every factor mentioned’ . . . .”).
221. Sainz, 827 F.3d at 606; Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1331–32 (describing the Paroline factors
as permissive rather than mandatory).
222. Sainz, 827 F.3d at 606; Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1330–31 (noting that the Seventh Circuit
did not rule explicitly on disaggregation).
223. United States v. Dillard, 891 F.3d 151, 162 (4th Cir. 2018) (vacating the district court’s
order and remanding the case with instructions to order restitution after further proceedings on that
issue); Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1330.
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a “guesswork,” the Fourth Circuit recognized there is an “inherent
imprecision” when calculating an amount of restitution in cases of
noncontact possessors and distributors.224 The Fourth Circuit avoided
determining whether the 1/n calculation was a permissible way to
calculate restitution or whether disaggregation is required.225 Like the
Seventh Circuit, the court opted to give district courts wide discretion in
setting the amount of restitution, but reiterated that restitution is
required.226
C. The Fifth, Eighth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits
The Fifth, Eighth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits reached
the opposite conclusion from the other circuits. When evaluating
defendants’ disaggregation arguments, the Fifth, Eighth, Eleventh, and
District of Columbia Circuits rejected the analysis of the Ninth Circuit.
The courts declined turning Paroline into a mathematical formula
through the imposition of a disaggregation requirement.227

224. Dillard, 891 F.3d at 160 (“[A] court must assess as best as it can from available evidence
the significance of the individual defendant’s conduct in light of the broader causal process that
produced the victim’s losses.” (emphasis added) (citing Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434,
459 (2014))); Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1330 (“In reversing, the Fourth Circuit explained Paroline
disavowed any such requirements.”).
225. Dillard, 891 F.3d at 161 (stating that “the district court was not faced with a binary choice”
to accept or reject the government’s proposed amount, but could adjust it to a more appropriate
amount); Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1330 (noting that there are various appropriate methods of calculating restitution).
226. Dillard, 891 F.3d at 161 (“Moreover, the district court is charged with the responsibility
of determining the proper amount of restitution in each case. It was the court’s responsibility to use
its ‘discretion and sound judgment’ to determine an appropriate amount for each non-contact victim.” (citations omitted)).
227. Rothenberg Petition for Certiorari, supra note 28, at 11–15 (discussing the Eighth and
Eleventh Circuits’ rejections of the disaggregation argument); Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1329 (discussing the reasoning of the Eighth and Fifth Circuits in rejecting a disaggregation requirement).
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In Halverson,228 Bordman,229 Rothenberg,230 and Monzel,231 the
defendants were all convicted of or pleaded guilty to the same kinds of
child pornography offenses.232 They were each ordered to pay restitution
to the identified victims.233 Each of the defendants argued on appeal that
the district court erred by not disaggregating the harm caused by the
initial physical abuse before calculating the restitution order for the harm
caused by his possession or distribution of the images.234 Each of the
228. Halverson pleaded guilty to possessing almost two thousand images of child sexual abuse
involving minors under the age of 12. United States v. Halverson, 897 F.3d 645, 649 (5th Cir.
2018). There were at least thirty-three victims, and “the images depicted violent sexual assault of
infants, toddlers, pre-pubescents, and adolescents.” Id. at 654.
229. Bordman pleaded guilty to sexual exploitation of a child and possession of child pornography of a minor under the age of twelve. United States v. Bordman, 895 F.3d 1048, 1051 (8th Cir.
2018). The images that Bordman possessed were particularly aggravating because some depicted
adult males penetrating toddlers and infants. Id. at 1052. Additionally, he produced child sexual
abuse imagery depicting his daughter and distributed the images. Id. His daughter was only oneand-a-half years old at the time. Id. He used platforms such as Kik, Dropbox, and Google to store,
receive, and distribute the images. Id.
230. Rothenberg pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography. United States v. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 2019). The conduct that Rothenberg actually engaged in,
unfortunately, was much worse than possession of child pornography. Id. Rothenberg was a member of a chatroom, and his username was “daddaughter-sex.” Id. He bragged that he was a lawyer
and he was sexually exploiting a young girl at his home, and he sent videos of child pornography
to an undercover officer. Id. Law enforcement went to his home to rescue the girl, who confirmed
that Rothenberg abused her. Id. While they were at his home, the officers seized Rothenberg’s
laptop and discovered approximately 1,000 unique videos and images of child pornography. Id.
The materials were aggravating because they depicted children under the age of twelve and sadomasochistic conduct. Id.
231. Monzel was convicted of distributing and possessing child pornography. United States v.
Monzel, 930 F.3d 470, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Due to numerous appeals, it took ten years to resolve
the restitution. Id. at 476–78.
232. Halverson, 897 F.3d at 649–50 (explaining that the defendant pleaded guilty to possession
of child pornography involving a minor under the age of twelve); Bordman, 895 F.3d at 1052–53
(explaining that the defendant pleaded guilty to sexual exploitation of a child and possession of
child pornography); Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1313 (explaining that the defendant pleaded guilty to
possession of child pornography); Monzel, 930 F.3d at 476 (explaining that the defendant pleaded
guilty to possession and distribution of child pornography).
233. Halverson, 897 F.3d at 649–50 (stating that the district court ordered the defendant to pay
a total of $50,317 to six victims); Bordman, 895 F.3d at 1052–53 (stating that the district court
ordered the defendant to pay $3,000 to a victim who goes by the name “Pia”); Rothenberg, 923
F.3d at 1313 (stating that the district court ordered the defendant to pay a total of $142,600 to nine
identified victims); Monzel, 930 F.3d at 476 (stating that the district court ordered the defendant to
pay $7,500 in restitution to Amy).
234. Halverson, 897 F.3d at 654 n.4 (“Halverson argues that many of the psychological reports
submitted by the victims did not separate the losses caused by Halverson from the losses caused by
other abusers . . . .”); Bordman, 895 F.3d at 1056 (“Third, Bordman argues that the district court
abused its discretion by failing to disaggregate the harm caused by the initial abuse from the harm
caused by his later possession.”); Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1314 (“Rothenberg argued, by contrast,
that the starting point should be ‘apportionment between the original abuser of the child, versus the
distributor, and later, possessor of the pornography,’ which Rothenberg referred to as ‘disaggregation.’ Rothenberg asserted that this disaggregation requires two steps: first, the district court must
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district courts in these cases considered the Paroline factors, but used
different calculations to come to a restitution amount.235
In Halverson, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s restitution
order because the record reflected that the district court relied on “various
factors that bear on the relative causal significance of [Halverson’s]
conduct in producing victim’s losses.”236 The court ruled that the
Paroline factors are merely “rough guideposts” rather than absolute
requirements; and therefore, the district court’s decision to forgo a formal
analysis of the factors was not fatal to the decision.237 Further, the Fifth
Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that the district court erred by
failing to disaggregate the harm caused by the initial abuser.238 The Fifth
Circuit instead concluded that neither Paroline nor § 2259(b)(3) requires
disaggregation between the harm caused by the defendant’s conduct and
“all other possible sources of the victims’ losses.”239
The defendant’s disaggregation arguments were likewise unsuccessful

separate the harm caused by the original abuser from that caused by later distributors and possessors; and second, the district court must separate the harm caused by the defendant from that caused
by other distributors or possessors.”); Monzel, 930 F.3d at 480 (“Specifically, he objects that the
government failed . . . to disaggregate Amy’s initial-abuse losses from her general loss figure . . . .”).
235. Halverson, 897 F.3d at 650 (explaining that the district court gave each victim $5,000 plus
$1,409 (since defendant had possessed 1,409 images of child pornography) per image that Halverson possessed unless the sum exceeded the amount of restitution that the victim sought); Bordman,
895 F.3d at 1053–54 (explaining that the district court used the 1/n calculation to set a restitution
amount); Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1315–21 (explaining that the government, by and large, supported the victims’ restitution requests and that the district court considered restitution orders in
other cases involving the victims’ images); Monzel, 930 F.3d at 478 (explaining that the district
court looked at the Paroline factors to set a restitution amount at $7,500).
236. Halverson, 897 F.3d at 654 (noting that the district court took into account the number of
victims, the number of images, and the content of the images depicted in creating its formula, and
individualized the application of the formula to each victim); see Rothenberg, 923 F.3d. at 1330
(“The Fifth Circuit approved the district court’s use of a restitution method which awarded each
victim (1) a base $5,000 amount of restitution, plus (2) an additional sum of $1,409 for each image
of the victim that the defendant possessed because the district court discussed factors that bore on
the relative significance of the defendant’s conduct and the district court was not required to make
findings as to all of the Paroline factors.” (citing Halverson, 897 F.3d at 653–54)).
237. Halverson, 897 F.3d at 654 (pointing out that the Supreme Court commented that district
courts “might consider” the Paroline factors) (emphasis added) (citing Paroline v. United States,
572 U.S. 434, 459 (2014)); Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1330 (“[T]he district court discussed factors
that bore on the relative significance of the defendant’s conduct . . . .”).
238. Halverson, 897 F.3d at 654–55 n.4 (reviewing the defendant’s contention that the district
court erred by not disaggregating the harm caused by the initial abuse for plain error); Rothenberg,
923 F.3d at 1330 (remarking that nothing in Paroline requires a victim to produce a psychological
report that disaggregates the defendant’s losses from any other source of the victim’s losses).
239. Halverson, 897 F.3d at 654–55 n.4 (“[I]t is not clear that either Paroline or § 2259(b)(3)
require victims to have a new report drafted in each case that disaggregates a defendant’s conduct
from all other possible sources of the victims’ losses.”); Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1330.
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in the Eighth Circuit.240 In Bordman, the court noted that in Paroline, the
Supreme Court contemplated the issues with disaggregation but did not
require such a method.241 Additionally, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that
the Paroline factors account for disaggregation by guiding district courts
to order higher amounts when the defendant is more involved in the
physical sexual abuse or distribution of the images.242 Recognizing that
the Paroline factors were designed to be “rough guideposts,” the court
declined to transform the disaggregation factor into a “rigid formula.”243
In Rothenberg, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument
that the district court erred by failing to disaggregate the victims’
losses.244 The court concluded the Paroline factor which guides district
courts to consider whether the offender was a producer or distributor
achieves the same goal as disaggregation.245 Furthermore, the factors “do
not require that the district court make fact findings about the amount of
losses caused by different groups of offenders.”246 The Eleventh Circuit
noted that the Supreme Court repeatedly stressed that district courts have
wide discretion in applying the Paroline factors and setting an amount

240. United States v. Bordman, 895 F.3d 1048, 1062 (affirming the lower court’s decision because it was consistent with past decisions in child pornography restitution cases and because the
court considered various factors in setting an amount for restitution); Rothenberg Petition for Certiorari, supra note 28, at 12 (“Rejecting that argument, the court of appeals reasoned that ‘one of
the Paroline factors already accounts for disaggregation’ . . . .”).
241. Bordman, 895 F.3d at 1058 (“‘[C]omplications may arise in disaggregating losses sustained as a result of the initial physical abuse.’ Nonetheless, the Court set ‘those questions . . . aside
for present purposes.’” (citing Paroline, 572 U.S. at 449)); Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1330 (concluding that the Paroline factors were not supposed to become rigid factors).
242. Bordman, 895 F.3d at 1057 (pointing specifically to the Paroline factor of “whether the
defendant had any connection to the initial production of the images . . . .” (citing Paroline, 134
572 U.S. at 460)); Rothenberg Petition for Certiorari, supra note 28, at 12 (pointing to the Paroline
factor of “whether the defendant had any connection to the initial production of the images”).
243. Bordman, 895 F.3d at 1059; Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1330 (“The Eighth Circuit ‘decline[d]
to transform’ this disaggregation factor ‘from a rough guidepost’ into a ‘rigid formula.’” (quoting
Paroline, 572 U.S. at 460)).
244. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1333 (“After careful review of Paroline, we conclude that a district court is not required to determine, calculate, or disaggregate the specific amount of loss caused
by the original abuser-creator or distributor of child pornography before it can decide the amount
of the victim’s losses caused by the later defendant who possesses and views the images.”); Rothenberg Petition for Certiorari, supra note 28, at 12 (“[T]he Eleventh Circuit expressly agreed with the
Eighth Circuit, disagreed with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, and held that Paroline does not require
disaggregation.”).
245. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1334; Rothenberg Petition for Certiorari, supra note 28, at 13 (“In
the Eleventh Circuit’s view, the district court ‘need only indicate in some manner that it has considered that the instant defendant is a possessor, and not the initial abuse[r] or a distributor . . . .’”
(citation omitted)).
246. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1334; Rothenberg Petition for Certiorari, supra note 28, at 13
(stating that the Eleventh Circuit relied on the decisions in United States v. Dillard, 891 F.3d 151,
160–62 (4th Cir. 2018) and United States v. Sainz, 827 F.3d 602, 605–07 (7th Cir. 2016), which
“refused to impose more structure beyond [Paroline’s] multi-factored test.”).
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for restitution.247 Agreeing with the Eighth Circuit’s analysis, the
Eleventh Circuit did not want to morph the flexible factors into a rigid
calculation.248 Since the district court weighed the factors and considered
the role that Rothenberg specifically played in causing the victims’ harm,
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed its judgment.249
In Monzel, the DC Circuit flatly rejected the defendant’s
disaggregation argument.250 First, the DC Circuit noted that the
disaggregation requirement would “impose a mathematical rigidity that
Paroline eschews.”251 Second, the DC Circuit explained that the district
courts already consider whether the defendant’s conduct was connected
to the initial production of the images.252 And third, the DC Circuit noted
that the disaggregation argument “blinks away the compounding effects
of demand for child-pornography images on their production in the first
place,” ignoring the harm that the victim, Amy, suffers knowing that
offenders are viewing her images for pleasure.253
The DC Circuit also considered the reasoning behind the circuits that
require disaggregation.254 Ultimately, the DC Circuit rejected the Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning because it found that the level of precision needed to
disaggregate ignores the “synergistic effect” possession of child sexual

247. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1334 (citing Paroline, 572 U.S. at 457–61); Rothenberg Petition
for Certiorari, supra note 28, at 12 (noting that the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that a strict disaggregation requirement would be inconsistent with Paroline’s “flexible, discretionary framework”).
248. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1334; Rothenberg Petition for Certiorari, supra note 28, at 12
(noting that the Eleventh Circuit relied on the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit).
249. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1334 (explaining that the district court considered that Rothenberg
played no role in the victims’ physical abuse or distributed the images); Rothenberg Petition for
Certiorari, supra note 28, at 13 (explaining that the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court’s
judgment after it considered that Rothenberg was just a possessor as opposed to a distributor or
producer).
250. United States v. Monzel, 930 F.3d 470, 483 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“Fifth, Monzel argues that
the district court was required to formally backout of Amy’s lifetime of psychological treatment
and social and vocational impacts those future damages attributable to both her initial abuse and
the initial distribution of her image. That argument, again, seeks to impose a mathematical rigidity
that Paroline eschews.”); see United States Sentencing Commission, Summary of Select Appellate
Cases for the Third Quarter of 2019, CASE LAW Q., July–Sept. 2019, at 1, 9,
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/case-law-documents/qtrly-vol3-iss3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5A64-YLMP] (explaining that Monzel does not require a “precise algorithm” for
calculating restitution amount).
251. Monzel, 930 F.3d at 483; see United States Sentencing Commission, supra note 250, at 9
(“[T]he court held that the district court’s decision ‘reflects a reasonable exercise of discretion . . . .’”).
252. Monzel, 930 F.3d at 483; see United States Sentencing Commission, supra note 250, at 9
(describing the district court’s restitution order for distribution and possession of child pornography
as reasonable).
253. Monzel, 930 F.3d at 483.
254. Id.
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abuse imagery has with its production.255 Lastly, the DC Circuit pointed
to the difficulties that district courts in the Ninth Circuit have faced
disaggregating harms.256 Specifically, several lower courts in the Ninth
Circuit denied restitution because the government could not meet its
“‘impossible [evidentiary] task’ of disaggregating, in a coherent way, a
victim’s lifetime of costs from the marketing of her images.”257
D. The Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act
of 2018
The Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act
of 2018 was a bipartisan bill which improved remedies and resources for
victims.258 Amy, Vicky, and Andy are victim advocates who were
depicted in heavily trafficked series of child sexual abuse imagery. The
Act was Congress’s third attempt to pass legislation in response to the
Paroline decision. The Justice for Amy Act of 2014 was introduced into
the Senate and proposed joint and several liability onto defendants.259
The following year, the Senate passed the Amy and Vicky Child
Pornography Victim Restitution Improvement Act of 2015; however, it
died in the House. The 2015 Act would have imposed joint and several
liability when an offender was ordered to pay restitution reflecting the
full amount of the victim’s losses. Alternatively, the Act would have
imposed minimum restitution awards, ranging from $250,000 to $25,000,
depending on the offense.260
In 2018, Senator Orrin Hatch led the bipartisan Amy, Vicky, and Andy
Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act, which was introduced
alongside Senators Amy Klobuchar, Dianne Feinstein, Chuck Grassley,
John Cornyn, and Pat Toomey, with several more cosponsors from both

255. Id.; see United States Sentencing Commission, supra note 250, at 9 (analyzing the Paroline
factors as rejecting precise calculations for restitution orders).
256. Monzel, 930 F.3d at 484 (citing United States v. Chan, CR No. 15-00224 DKW; 2016 WL
380712, at *2 (D. Haw. Jan. 29, 2016); United States v. Kugler, No. CR 14-73-BLG-SPW, 2016
WL 816741, at *3 (D. Mont. Feb. 29, 2016); United States v. Young, 703 F. App’x 520, 521 (9th
Cir. 2017); United States v. Massa, 647 F. App’x 718, 721 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Blurton,
623 F. App’x 318, 319 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Campbell-Zorn, No. CR 14-41-BLG-SPW,
2014 WL 7215214, at *14 (D. Mont. Dec. 17, 2014)) (collecting cases where victims were denied
restitution on the basis of government inability to disaggregate).
257. Monzel, 930 F.3d at 483–84.
258. Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of 2018, Pub. L. No.
115–299, 132 Stat. 4383 (stating in the congressional findings that the purpose of the Act was to
ensure that victims of child pornography are compensated for their anguish); Cassell & Marsh,
supra note 18, at 1 (explaining that the Act will be a “useful step forward” for victims).
259. See Justice for Amy Act of 2014, S. 2344, 113th Cong.
260. See Amy and Vicky Child Pornography Victim Restitution Improvement Act of 2015,
S. 295, 114th Cong.
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parties.261 Recognizing the continuous, twofold harm victims suffer, the
demand for images which drives exploitation, and the individual
responsibility of each offender, Congress sought to compensate victims
of child pornography “for the harms resulting from every perpetrator who
contributes to their anguish.”262 Thus, the 2018 Act amended the standard
for restitution in child pornography cases and established a victims
fund.263
Before the 2018 amendment to § 2259, district courts were to enter
restitution in the amount of the victim’s full losses subject to § 3664.264
Post-Paroline, district courts entered restitution in the amount that
“comport[ed] with the defendant’s relative role in the causal process that
underlies the victim’s general losses,” but there was no mandated
minimum amount.265 The 2018 amendment to § 2259 directs district
courts to enter a restitution order “in an amount that reflects the
defendant’s relative role in the causal process that underlies the victim’s
losses, but which is no less than $3,000,” quoting the language of
Paroline but codifying a minimum amount.266 When a victim receives
restitution from various defendants, the payments must stop once the
recovery meets the full amount of the victim’s demonstrated losses.267
The 2018 Act also established the Child Pornography Victims
Reserve, funded through special assessments of fees imposed on criminal
defendants collected under § 2259.268 Additionally, private entities and
individuals can choose to donate or gift assets to the fund.269 Victims may
261. See Klobuchar-Backed Amy, Vicky and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of
2018 Passes the Senate and Heads to the President’s Desk to be Signed into Law, AMY
KLOBUCHAR: U.S. SENATOR MINN. (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.klobuchar.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/11/klobuchar-backed-amy-vicky-and-andy-child-pornography-victim-assistanceact-of-2018-passes-the-senate-and-heads-to-the-president-s-desk-to-be-signed-into-law
[https://perma.cc/SSL2-VFWK].
262. Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of 2018, Pub. L. No.
115-299, 132 Stat. 4383.
263. See Cassell, infra note 271 (“This is an excellent new law . . . .”); see generally Cassell &
Marsh, supra note 18, at 1 (describing the Act as a “step forward” for victims).
264. Cassell, infra note 271.
265. Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 458 (2014).
266. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(2)(B) (stating that restitution amounts should be “no less than
$3,000.”); Paroline, 572 U.S. at 458.
267. See 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(2)(C) (“A victim’s total aggregate recovery pursuant to this section shall not exceed the full amount of the victim’s demonstrated losses. After the victim has received restitution in the full amount of the victim’s losses . . . the liability of each defendant . . .
shall be terminated.”).
268. See 18 U.S.C. § 2259A(a)(1)–(3) (explaining that the special assessments have caps depending on which type of offense the defendant is convicted).
269. See 18 U.S.C. § 2259(B)(a) (noting that private entities can make donations into the fund).
Technology companies, such as DropBox, Facebook (including Instagram), Snapchat, and Alphabet (including Google and YouTube), to name a few, should be called upon to ensure that the funds
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seek a one-time payment from the fund.270 The one-time payment
provides $35,000, adjusted each year for inflation, and does not preclude
the victim from collecting restitution from offenders.271
IV. ANALYSIS
First, this Part argues that disaggregation contravenes the holding in
Paroline.272 Second, this Part contends that the Paroline framework is
unworkable.273 Lastly, this Part concludes that although the Amy, Vicky,
and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act was a major
improvement for victims, it still falls short of creating a simple system
for victims of child pornography to receive full compensation.274
A. Disaggregation Conflicts with Paroline
Defendants consistently advocate for courts to adopt the
disaggregation requirement as it benefits them by reducing their total
liability. Several defendants in child pornography cases have furthered

are available, given their platforms’ roles in dispersing child sexual abuse imagery. Moreover, it
may be easier for victims to recover from these entities entirely, however, that implicates issues
which exceed the scope of this Comment. Furthermore, restitution plays a retributive impact on
offenders and victims. While technology websites play an essential role in the child sexual abuse
imagery industry, individuals are the driving force behind it. Restitution from offenders forces the
offenders to confront the consequences of their conduct, and provides accountability to the victims
who are harmed by so many.
270. See 18 U.S.C. § 2259(d)(2)(A) (“A victim may only obtain defined monetary assistance
under this subsection once.”); Cassell & Marsh, supra note 18, at 14–15 (noting that the fund could
theoretically collect over $15 million a year).
271. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2259 (applying aggregate causation in the congressional findings); Paul Cassell, The Amy, Vicky, and Andy Act Is Signed Into Law, REASON (Dec. 10, 2018,
11:56
AM)
https://reason.com/2018/12/10/amy-and-vicky-act-signed-into-law/
[https://perma.cc/HD6U-DCMB] (“The Act will help victims of what are frequently referred to as
‘child pornography’ crimes obtain full restitution.”).
272. See generally infra Section IV.A (explaining that even if disaggregation accounts for the
defendant’s relative role, there is no principled way to disaggregate losses, which are caused by the
compounded effect of sexual abuse depicted in the images and the circulation of those images on
the internet); see also United States v. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d 1309, 1309 (11th Cir. 2019) (evaluating different circuits’ reasoning regarding the disaggregation argument and concluding that Paroline does not require formal disaggregation of losses).
273. See generally infra Section IV.B (noting that at least two of the other factors are useless in
setting an amount of restitution); see also Paroline v. United States, 472 U.S. 434, 463 (2014)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the Paroline framework results in piecemeal orders to victims); United States v. DiLeo, 58 F. Supp. 3d 239, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Bluntly, the Court finds
itself among the growing throng of district courts which ‘have expressed their concern with the lack
of precise guidance from Congress and the Supreme Court in deciding restitution awards in these
circumstances.”).
274. See generally infra Section IV.C (analyzing the benefits, but noting the shortcomings of
the Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act); see also Cassell & Marsh,
supra note 18, at 17 (arguing that the Amy, Vicky, and Andy Act improves remedies for victims,
but does not do enough).
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this argument.275 Paroline only requires courts to hold defendants liable
for losses they have proximately caused.276 Defendants assert that the
proximate cause requirement mandates disaggregation because failure to
do so would render the defendants liable for all the harm suffered rather
than solely their individual contribution.277 Even the Supreme Court
commented in dicta in Paroline that there could be complications
disaggregating losses, although the Court ultimately set that issue
aside.278 So far, two of the defendants in federal courts of appeals that
rejected disaggregation filed petitions for writs of certiorari in the
Supreme Court, relying heavily on the cases which imposed
disaggregation, Dunn and Galan.279
Dunn should not be read as placing a disaggregation requirement for
all cases.280 That case is fact specific—when the defendant is held jointly
and severally liable for the losses, disaggregation is required to comport
with Paroline. The Eleventh Circuit’s reading of Dunn makes more sense
275. See, e.g., Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1313 (“On appeal, Rothenberg argues that: (1) the district court’s restitution order is flawed as to all of the victims because it failed to calculate and then
disaggregate the victim’s losses caused by the initial abuser, distributors, and other possessors from
those caused by Rothenberg himself . . . .”); United States v. Dunn, 777 F.3d 1171, 1174 (10th Cir.
2015) (“Fourth, he argues that the district court applied the wrong legal standard when it determined
that he owed a victim the full amount of her unpaid aggregated losses.”); United States v. Bordman,
895 F.3d 1048, 1056 (8th Cir. 2018) (“Third, Bordman argues that the district court abused its
discretion by failing to disaggregate the harm caused by the initial abuse from the harm caused by
his later possession.”); United States v. Halverson, 897 F.3d 645, 653 (5th Cir. 2018) (“Halverson
further raises a number of arguments related to Paroline v. United States: that the restitution formula was arbitrary, that the award did not sufficiently follow Paroline, and that the court lacked
proof regarding the loss amounts that Halverson proximately caused.”) (internal citations omitted);
United States v. Monzel, 930 F.3d 470, 480 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“Specifically, he objects that the
government failed . . . (iv) to disaggregate Amy’s initial-abuse losses from her general loss figure . . . .”); United States v. Galan, 804 F.3d 1287, 1289 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Galan contested the government’s calculations on the basis that no attempt was made to disaggregate the losses resulting
from the original abuse from the losses resulting from Galan’s own activities.”).
276. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Bordman, 895 F.3d 1048 [hereinafter Bordman Petition for Certiorari] (focusing on the “relative role” and “proximately caused” language to justify
disaggregation); Rothenberg Petition for Certiorari, supra note 28, at 18–19 (noting the “bedrock
principle” that defendants should not have to pay for the consequences of actions that have not been
caused by themselves).
277. Bordman Petition for Certiorari, supra note 276, at 10 (arguing that by not disaggregating
losses, defendants are liable for losses that they did not cause); Rothenberg Petition for Certiorari,
supra note 28, at 18 (noting that the victim’s general losses account for all of the victim’s losses—
from the initial abuse to the future trafficking of the images).
278. Bordman Petition for Certiorari, supra note 276, at 8 (quoting Paroline, 472 U.S. at 449);
Rothenberg Petition for Certiorari, supra note 28, at 18.
279. See generally Bordman Petition for Certiorari, supra note 276, at 8–10 (citing Dunn, 777
F.3d 1171; Galan, 804 F.3d 1287); see also Rothenberg Petition for Certiorari, supra note 28.
280. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1333 (“[W]e do not read Dunn as requiring disaggregation in each
and every restitution case.”); see generally Dunn, 777 F.3d at 1181–82 (holding that for Dunn it
was not reflective of his relative role to impose joint and several liability without disaggregating
the losses).
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than the argument urged by Rothenberg and Bordman, which maintained
that disaggregation is required in all cases involving possessors.281 In
Dunn, the district court held the defendant, a distributor with no
involvement with the production of the images, jointly and severally
liable with the producer of the images for the remainder of the victim’s
losses.282 For the district court’s order to comport with Paroline, the
Tenth Circuit had to disaggregate the losses caused by the producer
because those losses were not proximately caused by the defendant’s
actions.283 It is worth noting that the Tenth Circuit did not ever state that
district courts must disaggregate in all child pornography cases. Rather,
its holding focused narrowly on the circumstances of the defendant at bar,
Dunn.284 The Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of Paroline was appropriate
because the imposition of joint and several liability on Dunn did not
reflect the relative role of his actions in harming his victims.285
Proponents of disaggregation also rely on Galan, which undoubtedly
imposes a disaggregation requirement for district courts in the Ninth
Circuit.286 However, Galan’s interpretation of Paroline is flawed.287
Focusing on language that restitution amounts should reflect the
defendant’s “relative role” in causing the victim’s harm and that
defendants should only be liable for losses that they have “proximately
caused” to justify disaggregation analyzes these phrases in isolation by

281. See generally Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1332; see also Paroline, 572 U.S. at 458 (rejecting
attempts to hold defendants jointly and severally liable for losses).
282. Dunn, 777 F.3d at 1179; Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1332.
283. Dunn, 777 F.3d at 1181–82 (explaining that imposing joint and several liability on the
remainder of the victim’s general losses does not comport with Paroline’s rationale); Rothenberg,
923 F.3d at 1332–33 (explaining that holding the defendant jointly and severally liable for the victim’s remaining losses with several other offenders holds the defendant liable for losses that he did
not specifically cause).
284. Dunn, 777 F.3d at 1182 (“Thus, to the extent that the district court relied on an expert
report that did not disaggregate these harms, the district court’s adoption of $1.3 million as the total
measure of damages cannot stand.”); Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1333 (interpreting Dunn as specifically binding to that factual scenario and not to all child pornography restitution cases).
285. See Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1332; Paroline, 572 U.S. at 454 (concluding that Congress
did not intend that offenders of child pornography would be liable for the full amount of the victim’s
losses).
286. See Rothenberg Petition for Certiorari, supra note 28, at 9–10 (arguing that the Ninth Circuit in Galan came to the same conclusion as the Tenth Circuit in Dunn); Bordman Petition for
Certiorari, supra note 276, at 9–10 (explaining the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Galan and
using that line of reasoning to show the purportedly flawed reasoning of the Eighth Circuit).
287. See Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1335 (“However, the Supreme Court did not require district
courts to dive into the facts of every past order and position their restitution findings in relation to
those of other courts.”); United States v. Monzel, 930 F.3d 470, 483 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“For the type
of long-term harms at issue here, courts cannot be expected to formally disaggregate the intertwined.”); see also Paroline, 572 U.S. at 459 (explaining that setting an amount of restitution is a
matter where district courts have wide discretion to use sound judgment).
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separating them from their context within the Court’s opinion.288
The Paroline Court noted the difficulties of proving and setting a
restitution order that results from the defendant’s individual offense and,
accordingly, opted to create a flexible framework.289 In fact, the Court
chose to grant certiorari in Paroline precisely because of these
difficulties.290 The Court rejected but-for causation when proving that the
defendant’s actions caused the victim’s harm because to determine the
amount of harm specifically caused by individual offenders is impossible
for these crimes.291 By imposing a disaggregation requirement,
defendants ask the court set aside the portion of losses caused by the
initial abuser.292 However, there is no way to disaggregate the harm
caused by the initial abuser without being arbitrary.293 For example,
Amy’s case is an unusual circumstance where there is a clear demarcation
from the harm cause by the abuse and the harm caused by the circulation
of images. Amy received treatment and recovered from the physical
abuse. Several years later when she was notified of the trafficking of the
images, she regressed. For many victims, the twofold harm is blurry.
They suffer the harm concurrently, and oftentimes, recovery is not linear.
Even the Ninth Circuit stated that disaggregation need not be precise,
288. Monzel, 930 F.3d at 483 (stating that the disaggregation requirement seeks to impose the
“eschews” the mathematical rigidity that Paroline intended to avoid); Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1328
(noting the wide range of discretion that the Supreme Court gave district courts in this inquiry).
289. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 449 (noting the difficulty in determining the amount of the victim’s
losses proximately caused by the individual offender’s conduct); see Monzel, 930 F.3d at 448 (“We
are not the first, and surely will not be the last, court to wrestle with giving practical effect to Section
2259’s proximate-cause test for mandatory restitution in the context of child-pornography offenses.”).
290. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 443 (resolving a conflict between the federal circuits on these issues);
Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1325 (explaining the difficulties that the Supreme Court confronted in
Paroline because of the “atypical” process that harms the victims).
291. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 450 (explaining that but-for causation could be shown by producers,
people that allowed the abuse, and initial distributors, but that it cannot be shown when the possessor is one of several hundred others who are engaging in the same conduct anonymously); see
United States v. Galan, 804 F.3d 1287, 1289 (9th Cir. 2015) (“While Congress could and should
have made determination of the amount to which a victim is entitled a simple matter, it regrettably
did not.”).
292. Monzel, 930 F.3d at 483 (remarking that district court should not be required to disaggregate the “intertwined”); United States v. Halverson, 897 F.3d 645, 654–55 n.4 (5th Cir. 2018) (noting that Paroline did not clearly require disaggregation).
293. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1335 (noting that the district court would have to look at what all
other courts with cases involving the victim’s images decided and explain any deviations from
those other decisions); Paroline, 572 U.S. at 449 (“Complications may arise in disaggregating
losses sustained as a result of the initial physical abuse, but those questions may be set aside for
present purposes.”); see also Isra Bhatty, Navigating Paroline’s Wake, 63 UCLA L. REV. 2, 29
(2016) (“[A] related shortcoming of the Court’s restitution scheme is that its reliance on the discretion of district courts in awarding restitution, coupled with a confusing set of guideposts, invites
arbitrary implementation.”); Paroline, 572 U.S. at 471 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Nor can confidence in judicial discretion save the statute from arbitrary application.”).
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recognizing the inherent difficulty in differentiating between the harm
caused by the initial offender versus subsequent offenders.294 The
Supreme Court intentionally created a flexible framework that gave
district courts wide discretion in order to ensure that victims could
recover for their losses.295
The Supreme Court contemplated disaggregation when the Court
declared the Paroline factors, but decided against explicitly requiring
it.296 Instead, the Supreme Court created a set of factors which it
characterized as “rough guideposts.”297 Further, the Paroline factors state
that the district courts should consider the defendant’s involvement in the
imagery—whether he298 was a producer, distributor, or possessor of the
images.299 Given the fact that the Court created this factor test and
examined disaggregation, the Court did not intend to make
disaggregation a strict requirement for calculating restitution orders
because the factors do not require a strict application.300 Instead, the
Court instructed district courts to form a restitution order that reflects the
defendant’s relative role “as best it can.”301
The Paroline factor that directs district courts to consider whether the
294. Galan, 804 F.3d at 1291 (expressing no opinions on how district courts should apportion
losses caused by the initial abuse); Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1333 (analyzing Galan, 804 F.3d 1287,
and explaining that the Ninth Circuit only requires disaggregation to the “extent possible”).
295. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 462 (“This approach is not without its difficulties. . . . But courts can
only do their best to apply the statute as written in a workable manner, faithful to the competing
principles at stake . . . .”); United States v. Dunn, 777 F.3d 1171, 1180 (10th Cir. 2015) (noting the
wide discretion and estimation that district courts have in this matter).
296. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 449 (mentioning disaggregation of losses but not dealing with the
argument further); Galan, 804 F.3d at 1290–91 (focusing on portions of the opinion that contemplate disaggregation and state that defendants should be liable for the portion that they contributed
to the victim’s harms).
297. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 460 (elaborating that the factor should not be transformed into a rigid
formula that leaves victims with trivial restitution orders); United States v. Sainz, 827 F.3d 602,
606 (7th Cir. 2016) (interpreting Paroline as not requiring consideration of each and every Paroline
factor).
298. Offenders of child pornography prosecuted by the federal government are overwhelmingly
white (82%), male (97%), U.S. citizens (97%). See Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Number of Persons Prosecuted for Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children
Nearly Doubled between 2004 and 2013 (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/fpcsecc0413pr.cfm [https://perma.cc/8YEH-CT6Y]. Therefore, when referring to
offenders, I will use male pronouns.
299. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 460 (noting that district courts should consider whether the defendant
distributed the images or if the defendant had any involvement in the production of the images);
Cassell & Marsh, supra note 18, at 6–7 (describing the application of the Paroline factors and
acknowledging the criticism of the framework).
300. See Sainz, 827 F.3d at 605–06 (explaining that district courts were not bound to a rigid
interpretation of the statute); see also United States v. Halverson, 897 F.3d 645, 655 n.4 (5th Cir.
2018) (noting that Paroline does not obviously require disaggregation).
301. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 459 (explaining that district courts should assess, from the available
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defendant was a producer, distributor, or possessor adequately satisfies
the “relative role” requirement.302 If the defendant is a producer or initial
distributor, his restitution amount would be higher because he played a
larger role in causing the victim’s losses.303 When the defendant is a
possessor, district courts typically order lower amounts, which
recognizes that the defendant did not physically abuse the victim or put
the images into the public sphere via the internet.304 Therefore, courts do
not need to require disaggregation because the order will already reflect
the relative role of the defendant.
Furthermore, disaggregation should not be required because it is
impossible to apply without being arbitrary.305 The only way
disaggregation can occur easily is in cases like Amy’s—she was abused,
received treatment, recovered, and only relapsed several years later, when
she learned her images were online.306 Her case is linear. There is a clear
demarcation between her initial treatment for the physical abuse to her
successful recovery and finally to the subsequent treatment for the online
abuse. Even then, it is unclear whether part of her losses derives solely
evidence, a reasonable estimate of the significance of the defendant’s conduct in the broader causal
process which causes the victim’s harm); Dunn, 777 F.3d at 1180 (quoting Paroline, 572 U.S. at
459).
302. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 460 (“whether the defendant reproduced or distributed images of the
victim; whether the defendant had any connection to the initial production of the images”); United
States v. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d 1309, 1334 (11th Cir. 2019) (noting that the Paroline factors require
courts to take into account whether the offender was a distributor, producer, or offender, but that
district courts do not have to make exact findings of fact on what harm was caused by each of these
contributors).
303. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 672 F. Supp. 2d 771, 780 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (holding the
defendant, who produced child pornography of his three children, liable for $462,000); United
States v. Dillard, 891 F.3d 151, 155–56 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting that the district court ordered
$100,000 to a victim who provided minimal documentation of her losses, but who was physically
sexually abused by the defendant, and not ordering restitution for the victims which were subjects
in the images that the defendant possessed).
304. See, e.g., United States v. Quignon, No. 8:18CR43, 2018 WL 6831163, at *1 (D. Neb.
Dec. 27, 2018) (ordering $1,000 for a possessor when the average award in the series of child
pornography cases was $1,350); see also United States v. Romero-Medrano, No. 4:14–050, 2017
WL 5177647, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2017) (ordering a defendant to pay around $4,000 to a victim
whose images he possessed and around $6,400 to a victim whose images he distributed).
305. See United States v. Chan, No. 15-00224, 2016 WL 370712, at *2 (D. Haw. Jan. 29, 2016)
(characterizing the doctor’s apportionment of the damages caused by the different abusers as problematic); United States v. Monzel, 930 F.3d 470, 483–84 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citing several district
courts in the Ninth District that have denied restitution because the government is unable to meet
the evidentiary standard of disaggregation); Bhatty, supra note 293, at 30 (noting that in child pornography restitution matters, district courts’ discretion is virtually limitless).
306. See United States v. Reynolds, No. 12–20843, 2014 WL 4187936, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Aug.
22, 2014) (“But [disaggregation] only seems possible in the rather unique situation presented in
Paroline where there is some kind of demarcation between the losses from the initial abuse and the
losses from continued trafficking.”); United States v. Campbell-Zorn, No. 14–41-BLG-SPW, 2014
WL 7215214 at *4 (D. Mont. Dec. 17, 2014) (noting that there was no demarcation for disaggregation, so a restitution order would hold a defendant liable for losses he did not cause).
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from the circulation of her images, as opposed to the fact that she is
constantly reminded of her initial abuse, like a reopening of a wound.307
Within the Ninth Circuit, several district courts struggle applying Galan’s
required disaggregation and criticize the decision for further
complicating the restitution calculation.308
Proponents of disaggregation assert that each offense—possession,
production, and distribution—ought to be considered in isolation, despite
the fact that the offenses are inherently interconnected.309 However, the
possession of child pornography drives the production and distribution of
it because there is a premium for new material.310 Possessors contribute
to the sexual abuse of children because they drive the child sexual abuse
imagery industry to create new content and trade the images amongst
themselves.311 Consequently, requiring disaggregation erases the role
possessors have in driving the exploitation of children.
Overall, the Paroline Court created a flexible framework.
Disaggregation transforms the restitution analysis into rigid standard.
However, there is not a principled way to disaggregate because of the
amorphous nature of victims’ harms. Moreover, the defendant’s role (i.e.,
producer, distributor, or possessor) is already factored into the analysis.
307. Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 440 (2014) (“The knowledge that her images were
circulated far and wide renewed the victim’s trauma and made it difficult for her to recover from
her abuse.”); see Cortney E. Lollar, Child Pornography and the Restitution Revolution, 103 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 366, 369 (2013) (criticizing courts’ characterization that child pornography inflicts the primary harm because courts have not backed it up with social science research and “there is a substantial difference between acknowledging some degree of harm from the
circulation of those images and concluding that the circulation of those images is more damaging
than the actual abuse that led to the creation of the pornography.”).
308. See Chan, 2016 WL 370712, at *2 (“Indeed, taken together, the Court agrees with Defendant that ‘Paroline and Galan set out an impossible task for district courts’ that even Galan’s considered words do not sufficiently acknowledge and certainly do little to resolve.”); United States v.
Kugler, No. 14-73, 2016 WL 816741, at *3 (D. Mont. Feb. 29, 2016) (denying restitution because
of the difficulties in disaggregation).
309. See Monzel, 930 F.3d at 482–83 (noting that disaggregation fails to recognize the synergy
between possession, distribution, and production); DOJ CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 72,
at 25 (noting a website that contained one of the “world’s largest image repositories” of child sexual
abuse imagery where users actively exchanged images and noting operations in Louisiana where
young boys were enticed by operators and subjected to abuse that was broadcasted through a
webcam).
310. See DOJ CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 72, at 2, D-25, (noting that 100% of interviewees of the National Drug Intelligence Center—including prosecutors, investigators who had
inspected and reviewed massive amounts of data from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children and other sources—agreed that there is a relationship between sex tourism and
child pornography); WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 9 (noting that collectors place a
premium on new materials).
311. See WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 9 (noting that amateurs can more easily
record abuse, create new materials with the cell phones, and share it without similar levels of detection); Monzel, 930 F.3d at 482 (noting the compounding effects possession has on the demand
and production of child sexual abuse imagery).
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Lastly, disaggregation wipes away the synergistic effects that possession
has on the exploitation of children. Thus, a formal disaggregation
requirement does not comply with Paroline.
B. The Paroline Framework Is Unworkable
The disaggregation argument is just one of many issues with the
Paroline factors.312 Doing their best to apply a vague framework, the
lower courts rationally reason to different conclusions, which has led to
disparate orders for defendants.313
As an initial matter, Justice Kennedy rejected Amy’s argument that her
harm was similar to a “gang of ruffians” or a “gang rape[].”314 He
reasoned that child pornography offenders do not act in concert because
they do not interact with a great majority of offenders.315 However, even
though child pornography offenders rarely interact in person, they
interact frequently by trading the images via social media platforms, peerto-peer file sharing, and private networks of offenders.316 The internet
has allowed these offenders to buy, sell, and trade images among each
other with unprecedented ease and frequency.317 Although these actions
312. See United States v. Erickson, 388 F. Supp. 3d 1086, 1088–89 (D. Minn. 2019) (“Whatever
its theoretical appeal, the Paroline framework is very difficult—if not impossible—to apply in
practice.”); Bhatty, supra note 293, at 28 (noting that the Paroline framework has no statutory
support and that the Supreme Court’s “hesitance to provide further detailed guidance and its desire
to leave the intricacies of calculation to lower court discretion has left lower courts wondering how
to actually implement the Court’s roadmap.”).
313. See United States v. Campbell-Zorn, No. 14–41-BLG-SPW, 2014 WL 7215214, at *3 (D.
Mont. Dec. 17, 2014) (“Rather than attempt to forge yet another path through the bramble bush that
is the Paroline ‘framework,’ this Court relies heavily on analytical paths already beaten by other
district courts that have struggled with this determination.”); see generally United States v. Sainz,
827 F.3d 602, 602 (7th Cir. 2016) (approving wide discretion in applying Paroline factors); but see
United States v. Galan, 804 F.3d 1287, 1290–91 (9th Cir. 2015) (imposing a disaggregation requirement).
314. Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 454 (2014).
315. Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 454 (2014) (stating that the offenders are not acting in concert because they do not interact with a majority of those involved in the industry); but
see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 347 (West Group 5th ed. 1984)
(applying joint and several liability where it is “incapable of any reasonable or practical division.”).
316. See KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 280 (explaining that peer-to-peer networks are
popular means of sharing child sexual abuse imagery because they are “composed of participants
who directly ‘share’ resources, . . . without intermediary network hosts or servers.”); WORTLEY &
SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 9 (explaining that offenders interact by using websites, emails, peerto-peer networks, instant messengers, chatrooms, newsgroups, and bulletins on the internet).
317. See generally Keller & Dance, supra note 13 (noting the vastly expanding industry due to
the proliferation of the internet); KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 19 (“Although the underlying
motivation remains the same, offenders employ a variety of electronic tools to validate their behavior through communication with other offenders, to share and store their contraband, to obtain financial benefits from commercial child sexual exploitation, and to lure victims.”); Olivia Solon,
Inside the Surveillance Software Tracking Child Porn Offenders Across the Globe, NBC NEWS
(July 17, 2020, 4:04 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/inside-surveillance-software-
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occur anonymously and virtually, Justice Kennedy failed to recognize the
changes the internet introduced by allowing offenders to network with
more individuals through various platforms via screens as opposed to
physical meetings and tangible mailings.318
If disaggregation of the initial abuser’s harm were allowed, the next
logical step would be arguments for disaggregation of the harms caused
by all other offenders.319 However, this argument contains the same
problem that pre-Paroline courts were struggling to resolve. To
disaggregate the harm caused by each subsequent offender would render
it virtually impossible to prove a specific offender’s harm. For example,
in Amy’s case, she could not prove that any single offender was
specifically responsible for any portion of her harm, as her harm stemmed
from the availability of her images to such a large number of offenders.
To impose disaggregation of the initial offender would open the door to
disaggregation requirements for all later offenders which would lead to
the denial of relief for many victims.320
Many courts consider at least two Paroline factors to be
unworkable321: (1) the factor that directs courts to consider “any available
tracking-child-porn-offenders-across-globe-n1234019 [https://perma.cc/K7VD-K567] (noting that
law enforcement has seen an upswing since the coronavirus lockdowns because the additional time
people are spending viewing and distributing the materials).
318. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 454. It is worth noting that the only source that Justice Kennedy cited
in this paragraph, Prosser & Keeton on Torts, was published in 1984. Id.; see also PROSSER &
KEETON ON TORTS, § 52 (5th ed. 1984). The internet was not in mainstream use until the early
1990s. Kim Ann Zimmermann & Jesse Emspak, Internet History Timeline: ARPANET to the World
Wide Web, LIVE SCIENCE (June 27, 2017), https://www.livescience.com/20727-internet-history.html [https://perma.cc/3ST6-5ZZ8] (noting that the World Wide Web did not become public
until 1991).
319. Even if we had a reliable allocation among the original abuser(s), on the one hand, and
distributors/possessors, on the other, the logical extension of Paroline and, more particularly,
Galan require disaggregation within a given category. In other words, because Paroline pronounces, and Galan parrots, that restitution must “reflect the consequences of the defendant’s own conduct,” it appears non-sensical to disaggregate only between original abusers
and distributors/possessors. Disaggregation must also occur among distributors and/or
among possessors in order to determine the losses caused by Defendant’s conduct apart from
the losses caused by all others (including fellow possessors), and the task there is no less
difficult nor less imprecise.
See United States v. Chan, No. 15-00224, 2016 WL 370712, at *2 (D. Haw. Jan. 29, 2016) (internal
citations omitted); United States v. Erickson, 388 F. Supp. 3d 1086, 1088 (D. Minn. 2019) (remarking that even the starting point for Paroline is not helpful).
320. See Paroline, 572 U.S. at 449 (noting the difficulties in determining harm because of the
atypical causal process underlying the harm); id. at 468–69 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that
there should be no recovery because the government cannot prove but-for causation for individual
offender’s actions); United States v. Dillard, 891 F.3d 151, 160 (4th Cir. 2018) (“Paroline recognized the inherent imprecision of calculating an appropriate amount of restitution in cases involving
non-contact victims of child pornography . . . .”).
321. See United States v. Monzel, 930 F.3d 470, 482–83 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citing United States
v. Crisostomi, 31 F. Supp. 3d 361, 364 (D.R.I. 2014); United States v. Hite, 113 F. Supp. 3d 91,
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and reasonably reliable estimate” of other offenders (many of whom will
never be caught), and (2) the factor that directs courts to estimate the
number of future offenders.322 These factors are purely speculative—
there is no way of estimating how many offenders have possessed or
distributed a victim’s images, and there is no way to determine how many
individuals will traffic the images in the future.323 Furthermore, if these
factors are considered, they would lead to nominal restitution for

96–97 (D.D.C. 2015); United States v. DiLeo, 58 F. Supp. 3d 239, 245 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); United
States v. Wencewicz, 63 F. Supp. 3d 1238, 1246 (D. Mont. 2014), vacated and remanded on other
grounds; United States v. Grovo, 653 F. App’x 512, 515 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v. Moody,
No. 417–256, 2018 WL 3887506, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 15, 2018); United States v. Reddick, No.
2:17-208, 2018 WL 445112, at *6 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 16, 2018); United States v. Ayer, No. 2:15-86,
2015 WL 7259765, at *2 n.2 (D. Nev. Nov. 17, 2015); United States v. Romero-Medrano, 2017
WL 5177647, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2017); United States v. Schultz, No. 14-10085, 2015 WL
5972421, at *3 (D. Mass. Oct. 14, 2015); United States v. Gamble, No. 1:10-137, 2015 WL
4162924, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. July 9, 2015); United States v. Campbell-Zorn, No. 14-41, 2014 WL
7215214, at *3 (D. Mont. Dec. 17, 2014); United States v. Bellah, No. 13-10169, 2014 WL
7073287, at *3 (D. Kan. Dec. 12, 2014); United States v. McIntosh, No. 4:14-28, 2014 WL
5422215, at *5 (E.D. Va. Oct. 22, 2014); United States v. Daniel, No. 3:07-142, 2014 WL 5314834,
at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2014); United States v. Reynolds, No. 12-20843, 2014 WL 4187936, at
*6 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 22, 2014); United States v. Watkins, No. 2:13–00268, 2014 WL 3966381, at
*6–7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2014); United States v. Grovo, 826 F.3d 1207, 1221 (9th Cir. 2016);
United States v. Evans, 802 F.3d 942, 950 (8th Cir. 2015); United States v. Sainz, 827 F.3d 602,
607 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting that the information may not be “reliably known”).
322. See Sainz, 827 F.3d at 607 (“Many of the factors discussed in Paroline refer to information that may not even be reliably known. For example, the government may not be able to
produce evidence that would provide reasonable predictions about the number of offenders likely
to be convicted in the future or the broader number of offenders who were involved but are unlikely to be caught. Such predictions might well be mere guesses. But the Supreme Court made
clear in Paroline that the difficulty of coming up with reasonable estimates for an indeterminate
number of other offenders should not be a barrier to all compensation for victims of child pornography.” (internal citations omitted)); United States v. Sills, 712 F. App'x 581, 853 (7th Cir. 2018)
(“A court cannot reliably consider future defendants’ potential to reduce Sills’s share of responsibility without simultaneously accounting for the increase that additional defendants might cause
in Cindy’s total damages. It would be unsound to use such projections to increase the denominator without also considering their effect on the numerator. Using only the number of defendants
to-date and the victim’s damages to-date, as the Sainz method does, avoids these pitfalls.);United
States v. Erickson, 388 F. Supp. 3d 1086, 1089 (D. Minn. 2019) (“[T]here is simply no way for
any judge or attorney to make a ‘reasonable prediction’ about ‘the broader number of offenders
involved’ or ‘the number of future offenders likely to be caught and convicted.” Billions of people around the globe now have access to the Internet, and technology is advancing rapidly and unpredictably. Those who view child pornography do so furtively, and law-enforcement resources
are extremely limited, meaning that only a tiny fraction of those who view child pornography are
detected, even fewer are prosecuted, even fewer are ordered to pay restitution, and even fewer actually make restitution payments. Courts can know only that the number of past, present, and future offenders is ‘tragically large.’” (internal citations omitted)).
323. See Romero-Medrano, 2017 WL 5177647, at *3 (acknowledging that there would be some
number of future offenders that will be convicted and future offenders that will evade detection,
but not assigning any numbers because “[i]t would be irresponsible to guess at the total number of
offenders who will be prosecuted in the future.”); DiLeo, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 245 (“Indeed, it is hard
to fathom how, at any given point in time, such estimates and predictions could be more than a wild
guess.”).
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victims.324 For example, using the 1/n calculation, the market share for
Amy’s losses would amount to $47 per offender.325
Because at least two of the seven factors are unworkable, courts are
left to rely heavily on the factor that considers the number of past
defendants who have been convicted.326 However, this does not really
calculate an amount that reflects the defendant’s “relative role” because
the offenders that are convicted are a very small portion of all
offenders.327 For instance, suppose that 1,000 offenders possess Victim
X’s images. However, due to the limited capacities of law enforcement,
only ten have been prosecuted. Additionally, Victim X has $1 million in
documented losses. Assuming that the offenders all share the same
responsibility, they should each be liable for $1,000
($1,000,000/1,000 = $1,000). Using past defendants as a reference point
thereby magnifies the defendant’s responsibility because it represents his
responsibility relative to convicted offenders (a smaller group), as
opposed to offenders as a whole. In Victim X’s case, the court would look
at the ten defendants, as opposed to the 1,000 offenders. Each defendant’s
share
of
responsibility
is
assessed
at
$100,000
($1,000,000/10 = $100,000), instead of $1,000. By considering the other
convicted offenders, the district courts are not really considering the
defendant’s “relative role.” Instead, they consult other courts to ensure
that the amount set is reasonable.328 Moreover, reliance on the number of
324. See Bhatty, supra note 293, at 17 (noting that courts have decided to order restitution from
the amounts of nothing to $7,500 for offenders engaged in identical conduct); Dillard, 891 F.3d at
156 (explaining that the district court did not order restitution).
325. See Cassell & Marsh, supra note 18, at 6–7 (calculating Paroline’s market share of Amy’s
harm by dividing the full amount of her losses by the estimated number of potential defendants
(estimating potential defendants by taking the total number of known cases where Amy’s images
have been found multiplied by the offender apprehension rate and multiplied by the estimated percentage of child pornography offenders in the country); Respondent Amy’s Br. on the Merits at 65
n.19, Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014) (No. 12-8561) (calculating
3,367,854 × 1/3,200 × 1/10 × 45/100 ≈ $47).
326. See Romero-Medrano, 2017 WL 5177647, at *2 (“Many courts appear to focus on the most
readily determined Paroline factor: the number of past criminal defendants found to have contributed to a victim’s losses.”); Sainz, 827 F.3d at 606 (affirming the district court’s order, which utilized the 1/n calculation).
327. See Paroline, 572 U.S. at 460 (noting that a calculation would limit district courts from
considering all of the facts of each individual case); Romero-Medrano, 2017 WL 5177647, at *4
(noting that the government argued that the factor which considers the past defendants is unworkable because the United States Attorney’s Office [the prosecuting body for federal crimes, including child pornography offenses] does not have information regarding state, local, and international
prosecutions and that the number of past defendants is “neither meaningful nor helpful” for setting
a restitution amount).
328. See Romero-Medrano, 2017 WL 5177647, at *3 (“The number of defendants who have
paid is not relevant to Defendant Romero-Medrano’s proportional causal role . . . .”); see, e.g.,
United States v. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d 1309, 1315–21 (11th Cir. 2019) (considering the various
restitution orders victims have received from other offenders when setting restitution amounts).
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past convicted offenders and using variations of the 1/n equation
proposed by Gamble defies Paroline’s instruction against rigid
mathematical calculations.329
Lastly, the Paroline framework imposes vastly different results on
defendants convicted of similar conduct.330 Without clear guidance on
how to approach ordering an amount of restitution, courts have done their
best to assess what role the defendant played in causing the underlying
harm.331 Each restitution order is a shot in the dark.332 For some, that has
meant setting nominal amounts, and for others, it has meant ordering
substantial amounts.333 In Paroline, Justice Kennedy stated that
329. See Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1335 n.8 (“While we affirm the thorough and multifactored
process used in this case, we caution that the application of a strict 1/n approach . . . ordinarily will
not meet the individualized assessment requirement of Paroline.”); United States v. Dillard, 891
F.3d 151, 156 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting that the district court rejected the government’s proposed
calculation of 1/n because the calculation was “just a ‘stab in the dark’” for setting an amount of
restitution); United States v. Romero-Medrano, 899 F.3d 356, 358–60 (5th Cir. 2018) (affirming
the district court’s restitution order and explaining that the district court applied the 1/n calculation
to formulate a base amount for victims, Vicky and Sarah, then reduced both by 10% to reflect
offenders who will be prosecuted in the future or who wil not be prosecuted at all, and finally,
reduced Vicky’s by an additional 10% because the defendant was merely a possessor—in Sarah’s
case, he was a distributor, and the additional reduction because he was more culpable in causing
her losses).
330. See, e.g., Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1318 (noting that the restitution orders to Vicky have
ranged from $24 to $1 million); Bhatty, supra note 293, at 33 tbl.6 (comparing restitution awards
post-Paroline) (table reproduced here).
TABLE 6: MINIMUM, MAXIMUM, AVERAGE, AND MEDIAN
RESTITUTTION AWARDS IN POST-PAROLINE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
CASES, BY OFFENSE TYPE
Minimum
Maximum
Average
Median
award
award
award
award
Production
$56
$250,000
$23,447
$6,000
(n=37)
Distribution
$500
$976,418
$18,262
$3,000
(n=73)
Possession
$500
$33,000
$6,636
$4,000
(n=35)
331. See United States v. Monzel, 930 F.3d 470, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“As to the purported
$7,186 over-inclusion of loss, the impact—if any—in determining Monzel’s share of Amy’s more
than $3 million in losses is at best de minimis, and at worst incalculable.”); United States v. Berry,
No. 1:18-00107, 2019 WL 5306960, at *3 (D. Or. Oct. 21, 2019) (highlighting the Court’s order in
Paroline that district courts should do the “best” they can in this inquiry).
332. See e.g., United States v. Sainz, 827 F.3d 602, 605 (7th Cir. 2016) (using the 1/n method
to calculate a restitution order); cf. United States v. Halverson, 897 F.3d 645, 650 (5th Cir. 2018)
(“The restitution was calculated by awarding six victims $5,000 plus $1,409 [the total number of
images that the defendant possessed] per image possessed by Halverson, unless that amount exceeded the amount sought by the victim.”).
333. See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 777 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir. 2015) (noting that the
district court ordered the defendant to pay $583,955 because he was a distributor of the images);
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restitution should be an “application of law” rather than a
“decisionmaker’s caprice”; however, the vague framework that the Court
created left district courts with no choice but to do just that.334
Generally, this process forces victims to engage in litigation for years
to recover piecemeal awards.335 Unlike victims of other crimes, who are
entitled to restitution for the full amount of their losses (unless the
defendant is indigent), victims of child pornography are not guaranteed
recovery for the full amount of their losses.336 The only reason for this is
because victims of child pornography are exploited by too many
people.337 To recover the full amount of his or her losses, each victim
must go through the restitution process again and again until enough
defendants pay orders which, added together, equal the full amount of the
victim’s losses.338 Some argue that this continuous cycle of litigation and
restitution orders is detrimental to victims by making it more difficult for

Monzel, 930 F.3d at 476–78 (noting that the district court originally ordered the defendant to pay
$5,000 in restitution, then denied restitution, but finally ordered the defendant to pay $7,500).
334. Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 462 (2014) (recognizing also the difficulties in the
approach); see also Sainz, 827 F.3d at 606 (upholding the district court’s order because “the amount
of the award is substantively reasonable”); Paroline, 572 U.S. at 471 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(commenting that the approach, which “asks district judges to impose restitution or other criminal
punishment guided solely by their own intuitions regarding comparative fault” undermines every
defendant’s right to due process of the law).
335. See, e.g., Monzel, 930 F.3d at 476–78 (explaining the complicated procedural background
of the case and the various appeals that occurred over the course of ten years for a restitution hearing); see also Paroline, 572 U.S. at 439–43 (similarly explaining the complicated procedural background of the case and the various appeals that occurred over the course of fifteen years until the
Supreme Court decided the case in 2014).
336. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2259 (limiting recovery for the full amount of the victim’s losses
only for child pornography offenses); United States v. Whitely, 354 F. Supp. 3d 930, 933 (N.D. Ill.
2019) (“Congress authorized the ‘full amount’ of losses . . . . Congress wanted district courts to
‘have broad discretion in ordering restitution . . . to compensate the victims of sexual abuse for the
care required to address the long term effects of their abuse.’” (citing United States v. Rockett, 752
F. App’x 448, 450 (9th Cir. 2018)); United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645, 656 (6th Cir. 2012)
(discussing why victims of child pornography are not guaranteed recovery for the full amount of
their losses).
337. See generally Paroline, 572 U.S. at 458 (ruling that the defendant’s liability for child pornography offenses should reflect the “relative role” of the defendant’s contribution to the victim’s
losses, although the statute directs court to order restitution for the full amount of the victim’s
losses); id. at 477 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“At bottom, Congress did not intend § 2259 to create
a safe harbor for those who inflict upon their victims the proverbial death by a thousand cuts.”).
338. See United States v. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d 1309, 1314 (11th Cir. 2019) (explaining the
complicated process by which a victim of child pornography is identified and notified and receives
restitution); Paroline, 572 U.S. at 470 (Robert, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he significant majority of
defendants have been ordered to pay Amy $5,000 or less. This means that Amy will be stuck litigating for years to come.” (internal citation omitted)).
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victims to move on because they cannot move past the trauma that they
have suffered.339
C. The Shortcomings of The New Amy, Vicky, and Andy Act
The Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act
of 2018 was, without doubt, a step in the right direction for victims.340
The Act sets a floor for district courts ordering restitution: they must order
at least $3,000 to each requesting victim.341 Additionally, the Act creates
the Child Pornography Victims Reserve.342 Once a victim shows that he
or she is a victim of a defendant’s offense, the victim is entitled to a
onetime payout of $35,000.343 Defendants of federal crimes supply this
fund through special assessments.344 Additionally, the bill allows victims
of child pornography to view their images, which improves victim and
offender identification and can be important for the victim’s recovery
process.345 Lastly, the Act codifies the language of Paroline by directing
district courts to order restitution in the amount that reflects the
defendant’s relative role in causing the victim’s losses.346
The Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act
339. See Lollar, supra note 307, at 382 (“Rather than helping child abuse victims recover from
their trauma, courts and legislators are inadvertently anchoring them in their abuse experience by
keeping their negative sexual experiences constantly at the forefront.”); Binford et al., supra note
37, at 123 (“Congress must pass new legislation. . . . [This is one step toward ensuring] that the
victimization does not continue in perpetuity and the individuals harmed by this horrific crime have
the opportunity to recover once and for all.”).
340. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2259 (“It is the intent of Congress that victims of child pornography be compensated for the harms resulting from every perpetrator who contributes to their anguish. Such an aggregate causation standard reflects the nature of child pornography and the unique
ways that it actually harms victims.”); Cassell, supra note 271 (“The Act will help victims of what
are frequently referred to as ‘child pornography’ crimes obtain full restitution.”).
341. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(2)(B) (stating that restitution amounts should be “no less than
$3,000”); Cassell, supra note 271, (noting that from a practical standpoint, the $3,000 prevents
“token award[s]”).
342. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(d)(1)(A) (noting that victims of defendants convicted of trafficking in
child pornography may elect to recover from the Child Pornography Victims Reserve); United
States v. Berry, No. 1:18-00107, 2019 WL 5306960, at *2 (D. Or. Oct. 21, 2019) (noting the creation of the new rights and remedies for victims).
343. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(d)(2)(A) (“A victim may only obtain defined monetary assistance under
this subsection once.”); Cassell, supra note 271 (explaining that the amount of recovery is adjusted
yearly to account for inflation).
344. 18 U.S.C. § 2259A(a)(1)–(3) (noting that district courts should impose special assessments
for the victims fund, which should not exceed a certain amount for the different levels of offenses—
i.e., lower amounts for possession, higher for distribution, and highest for production); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2259B(a) (noting that private entities can make donations into the fund).
345. 18 U.S.C. § 2259 (explaining that the Act amended 18 U.S.C. § 3509, which allows victims of child pornography to inspect and view the images depicting their abuse and that any victim’s
expert witness may view the images as well).
346. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(a)(2)(B) (“[T]he court shall order restitution in an amount that reflects
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provides substantially better assistance for victims.347 Aside from adding
new remedies, the Act gives victims more autonomy and control by
allowing them to choose between different options of relief and have
access to their images.348
While the Act significantly improves options for victims, it falls short
of providing victims an avenue to obtain the full recovery for losses that
victims of other crimes are afforded.349 Instead, by codifying the
language of Paroline, victims will have to continue recovering the same
piecemeal restitution as they would have under the former system.350
While the Act ensures that restitution orders will never be a nominal
amount, $3,000 is just not enough given the magnitude of these victims’
losses.351 For example, Amy reported over $3.4 million in losses—it
would take over a thousand offenders to meet this if courts order
restitution amounts of $3,000 and over three hundred offenders if courts
order restitution amounts of $10,000. Additionally, while the onetime
$35,000 payout is an improvement, it still does not provide the same
recovery as full restitution would.352 It typically represents a small

the defendant’s relative role in the causal process that underlies the victim’s losses . . . .”); see Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 458 (2014) (“[A] court applying § 2259 should order restitution in an amount that comports with the defendant’s relative role in the causal process that underlies the victim’s general losses.”).
347. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2259 (raising the minimum restitution amount, creating a victim
fund, providing victims with more rights); Cassell & Marsh, supra note 18, at 9 (noting that the
$3,000 minimum for restitution orders was a “modest,” but “important” change for victims of child
pornography).
348. Cassell & Marsh, supra note 18, at 17 (noting that the provision allowing victims to view
their own images finally gives victims and their attorneys the opportunity to see the images that are
at issue in their cases because prior to the amendment, only defense attorneys, government attorneys, and judges could view the materials).
349. Cassell, supra note 271 (“This is an excellent new law . . . .”).
350. See United States v. Berry, No. 1:18-00107, 2019 WL 5306960, at *2 (D. Or. Oct. 21,
2019) (noting that although the new Act sets a baseline restitution amount at $3,000, district courts
still must undertake the Paroline analysis); see also United States v. Darbasie, 164 F. Supp. 3d 400,
404 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Written to command Olympic effort, Paroline offers precious little practical
guidance to the trial bench charged with its implementation.”).
351. Cassell, supra note 271 (noting that one benefit is that it prevents token orders); Berry,
2019 WL 5306960, at *2 (“But this fixed minimum amount [$3,000] prevents courts from awarding
nominal or trivial amounts for restitution, which further protects victims.”).
352. See, e.g., United States v. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d 1309, 1315–20 (11th Cir. 2019) (estimating that Sierra’s future medical care costs over $600,000, Jane’s future medical costs at over
$100,000, Pia’s future therapy costs at over $80,000, Mya’s future psychological treatment costing
over $100,000, Vicky’s future therapy costs at over $100,000, Amy’s future counseling costs at
over $500,000, and Casseaopeia’s future medical costs at over $300,000); see also Xiangming Fang
et al., The Economic Burden of Child Maltreatment in the United States and Implications for Prevention, 36 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 156, 159 (2012) (“Total annual health care costs were 21%
higher . . . for women with a history of physical or sexual childhood abuse compared to women
without these abuse histories.”).
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fraction of the losses that the victim has suffered.353 At the end of the day,
victims are still left bearing the costs of their own victimization.354
Due to the codification of the vague Paroline language, the
government (who bears the burden of proving the victim’s losses), the
victim, and the defendant are forced to engage in drawn out litigation.355
Because the Act did not clarify the language in the Paroline framework,
district courts will be confronted with the same difficulties in setting a
restitution amount.356
V. PROPOSAL
Given the clear congressional approval of the Paroline framework in
the Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of
2018, the Supreme Court will not be able to simply discard the framework
and replace it with something better.357 The most that lower courts can
do is order and approve higher restitution orders given the severity of the
conduct and reject arguments which attempt to transform Paroline into a
more rigid framework.358 As a result, like Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Sotomayor called for in the Paroline decision, Congress needs to
353. See generally Rothenberg, 923 F.3d 1309 (noting the victims suffer from severe psychological disorders and that those costs are high); see also CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE STATISTICS, supra
note 70, at 7 (noting that the average additional costs of medical care exceeds six figures).
354. See United States v. Whitely, 354 F. Supp. 3d 930, 939 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (“[T]he criminal
justice system is failing survivors by forcing them to bear the permanent costs of their own trafficking.”); Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 470–71 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (remarking that the majority only responds that Congress has not promised “full and swift” restitution
and noting that Amy may never recover the full amount of her losses because law enforcement is
never going to be able to find or prosecute everyone that has harmed her).
355. See United States v. Monzel, 930 F.3d 470, 476–78 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (explaining the tenyear procedural background behind the ruling for $7,500 in Monzel—the defendant was originally
convicted in 2009, he argued that the restitution order should be $100, the district court set it at
$5,000, Amy filed a writ of mandamus because the district court recognized that it ordered an
amount that was lower than her general losses, the Eleventh Circuit held that joint and several
liability did not apply and remanded the case, the district court denied restitution, the government
appealed, the Eleventh Circuit denied the appeal until Paroline, once Paroline was decided the
Eleventh Circuit remanded again with instructions to follow the Paroline framework, the district
court ordered $7,500 in restitution, and finally the Eleventh Circuit ruled on the defendant’s appeal
in 2019).
356. United States v. Berry, No. 1:18-00107, 2019 WL 5306960, at *1–2 (D. Or. Oct. 21, 2019)
(discussing Paroline’s application to The Amy, Vicky, and Andy Act of 2018); Cassell & Marsh,
supra note 18, at 9 (explaining that the 2018 Act sets the baseline recovery for victims at $3,000,
which can be increased based on the defendant’s “relative role” using the Paroline factors).
357. LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 1 (2014) (explaining that the judiciary is to “construe
statutes” as “so enacted”); see Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556, 578 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“but that does not relieve us of our responsibility to be faithful to the congressional
design”).
358. See EIG, supra note 357, at 3 (“In interpreting statutes, the Court recognizes that legislative
power resides in Congress . . . .”); see Berry, 2019 WL 5306960, at *2–3 (discussing the Amy,
Vicky, and Andy Act of 2018 and Paroline in its analysis).
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take action to improve this system.359
This Part proposes that all defendants should be held jointly and
severally liable for the full amount of the victim’s losses.360 District
courts should have to set a periodic payment schedule, and a cause of
action for contribution should be added.361 Furthermore, once the victims
have provided evidence to demonstrate their losses, the district courts
should accept that amount of restitution.362 Lastly, government attorneys
should be the ones primarily tasked with requesting restitution.363
A. Joint and Several Liability
Joint and several liability ensures that victims have a guaranteed path
toward full recovery.364 It holds defendants liable for all of the victim’s
harms individually, but also as a group.365 Child pornography offenses
are a perfect example of when joint and several liability is appropriate.366

359. See Paroline, 572 U.S. at 472 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[W]e ought to say so, and give
Congress a chance to fix it.”); see also Berry, 2019 WL 5306960, at *2 (“I was not alone in joining
Chief Justice Robert’s [sic] and Justice Sotomayor’s calls for Congressional action.” (citing United
States v. Schultz, No. 14-10085, 2015 WL 5972421, at *3 (D. Mass. Oct. 14, 2015))); United States
v. Whitely, 354 F. Supp. 3d 930, 939 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (“The legislative branch did its job to address
this public health crisis; now it is time for the executive and judicial branches to step up and do
theirs.”).
360. See Paroline, 572 U.S. at 473 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should
have affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s judgment imposing joint and several liability with instructions to
consider a periodic payment schedule on remand); see also Cassell & Marsh, supra note 18, at 13–
14 (explaining the tort principles behind aggregate causation and the implications of it).
361. See Paroline, 572 U.S. at 485 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that periodic payment
schedules would alleviate concerns that one defendant would be left paying for the full amount of
the victim’s losses).
362. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”); Reid & Collier, supra note 21, at
694 (explaining that “full faith and credit” would allow the initial district court hearing the victim’s
case to set an amount of the victim’s documented losses so that the victim would not need to relitigate the issue over and over and would prevent dual recovery).
363. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664 (noting that the burden is on the government’s attorney to prove the
documented losses caused by the offender’s conduct); see also Paroline, 572 U.S. at 443 (noting
that the government must prove the amount of losses caused by the defendant’s conduct).
364. See Paroline, 572 U.S. at 473 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (explaining that offenders would
be ordered to pay restitution on a periodic payment schedule until the victim’s restitution order is
satisfied); 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(3)(A) (“A restitution order may direct the defendant to make a single, lump-sum payment, partial payments at specified intervals, in-kind payments, or a combination
of payments at specified intervals and in-kind payments.”).
365. See Paroline, 572 U.S. at 473 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[T]ort law principles . . . treat
defendants like Paroline jointly and severally liable for the indivisible consequences of their intentional, concerted conduct.”); Joint and Several Liability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019) (“[E]ach liable party is individually responsible for the entire obligation, but a paying party
may have a right of contribution or indemnity from nonpaying parties”).
366. See Paroline, 572 U.S. at 475–76 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing the tort principles
underlying the Act and noting that it was common knowledge at the time the Act was passed that
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Joint and several liability is typically imposed when multiple actors
engage in independent conduct that inflicts an indivisible injury on a
victim.367 An indivisible injury means that it is unknowable what portion
of the losses each offender caused. This is appropriate in child
pornography cases because all of the participants, the producer,
distributor, and possessor, each contribute to the victim’s harm.
Joint and several liability ensures that restitution is ordered “as an
application of law” as opposed to as a “decisionmaker’s caprice.”368
Judges would have no discretion but to adjudge each defendant the
victim’s total losses, ensuring each defendant will liable for the same
amount as every other offender convicted of crimes involving a specific
victim.369 Periodic payment schedules allow defendants to all contribute
to the victim’s restitution order over time. Additionally, a cause of action
for contribution would allow defendants to recover costs from defendants
that did not contribute. Periodic payment schedules and a cause of action
for contribution are discussed in greater detail below.
Joint and several liability may incentivize defendants to work with law
enforcement to expose the criminal underground of online child sexual
abuse imagery offenders more effectively.370 The more offenders that are
convicted, the less each individual convicted offender would have to
pay.371 Giving offenders an incentive to cooperate and provide more
child sexual abuse imagery was being transmitted in large amounts electronically); id. at 458 (majority opinion) (noting that aggregate causation is part of the “background legal tradition” that Congress relied on).
367. See id. at 483 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (providing the uniform rule governing joint and
several liability under Restatement (Third) of Torts); In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749, 773 (5th
Cir. 2012) (noting that, on remand, the district court “must ascertain the full amount of the victim’s
losses,” focusing in particular on joint and several liability), rev’d sub nom. Paroline v. United
States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014).
368. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 462 (quoting Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 352
(2007)) (remarking that lower courts “can only do their best” when setting a restitution amount);
but see id. at 480 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (remarking that the full amount of the victims’ losses
are ordered onto individual defendants).
369. See Paroline, 572 U.S. at 473 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that she would have imposed joint and several liability). “Once a defendant is found to bear a sufficient causal nexus to a
victim’s harm, § 2259 provides a straightforward instruction on how much restitution a court is to
order: ‘The order of restitution under this section shall direct the defendant to pay the victim . . .
the full amount of the victim’s losses.’” Id. at 480 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1)).
370. See Contribution Claim, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A defendant’s
claim to recover part of his or her liability to a plaintiff from another defendant or some third party
who, it is asserted, should share in the liability.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 23
(AM. LAW INST. 2000) (“When two or more persons are or may be liable for the same harm and
one of them discharges liability of another by settlement or discharge of judgment, the person discharging the liability is entitled to recover contribution from the other, unless the other previously
had a valid settlement and release from the plaintiff.”).
371. See Paroline, 572 U.S. at 487 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (explaining that this approach
would serve the interest of justice); see also WILLIAM ADAMS & ABIGAIL FLYNN, FEDERAL
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information leads to more effective investigations, identifications, and
prosecutions of other offenders. As a result, individual offender
restitution orders would decrease because more people would be
contributing to the recovery.372
Joint and several liability also eliminates the commodification of
victims and humanizes victims.373 Under the current system, there is a
“pay-per-view” mentality.374 Joint and several liability avoids this
commodification because courts must order repayment for the victim’s
full losses, which recognizes the victim’s human dignity by compensating
her for the entirety of the harm inflicted. By assigning a specific portion
of the losses onto a defendant, restitution seems like payment for harm
caused by individual viewing of the victim’s images.375 Conversely, by
ordering restitution for the full amount of the victim’s losses, defendants
are forced to confront the real person behind the computer screen as
opposed to simply paying “per-view.”376 The defendant is paying the
losses suffered by a person who is harmed every day that her images are
traded on the internet.377 This humanization of victims could inspire
PROSECUTIONS OF COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN CASES, 2004–2013, DEPT.
OF
JUST. 1 (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fpcsecc0413.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KBZ3-T35U] (noting the increases in suspects referred, cases filed, and defendants convicted).
372. See Paroline, 572 U.S. at 487 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[S]chedule would allow the
individual wealthy defendant’s ultimate burden to be substantially offset by payments made by
other offenders . . . .”); ADAMS & FLYNN, supra note 371, at 2 (explaining that child pornography
possession, distribution, and receipt offenses account for the vast majority of commercial sexual
exploitation of children offenses—they account for over 70% of the charges—while child sex trafficking follows, and child pornography production is the lowest prosecuted commercial sexual exploitation of children offense).
373. See Paroline, 572 U.S. at 481 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); ADAMS & FLYNN, supra note
371, at 7 (noting that offenders of commercial sexual exploitation of children crimes are likely to
be convicted if charges are filed).
374. Lollar, supra note 307, at 379 (comparing that courts are ordering restitution like they are
giving entertainment royalties); see also Erin V. Wallin, Paroline: The Damages and the Damages
Done, 5 LINCOLN MEM’L U. L. REV. 165, 184 (2017) (remarking that the current restitution system
is comparable to a “pay-per-view” system).
375. Lollar, supra note 307, at 379 (“This royalties approach does more than commodify victims’ images; it also commodifies the victims’ lost innocence and virginity.”); Wallin, supra note
374, at 187 (“randomly calculated amount ‘per-view’”).
376. See Paroline, 572 U.S. at 479 n.3 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is no reason to read
§ 2259(b)(4)’s ‘mandatory’ restitution command out of the statute for child abusers who hide behind the anonymity of a computer screen.”); but see, e.g., United States v. Halverson, 897 F.3d 645,
650 (5th Cir. 2018) (stating that the district court ordered the defendant to pay each victim another
$1,409 per every additional image that he possessed of him or her on top of a base of $5,000).
377. See Paroline, 572 U.S. at 458 (“Restitution is an effective rehabilitative penalty because it
forces the defendant to confront . . . the harm his actions have caused” (quoting Kelly v. Robinson,
479 U.S. 36, 49 n. 10 (1986))); United States v. Dubose, 146 F.3d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 1998)
(holding that the MVRA is subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment because it serves
“deterrent, rehabilitative, and retributive purposes”); but see In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749,
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rehabilitation in offenders better than lengthy prison sentences.378
Alongside the issue of commodification, criminal law needs to be more
flexible in recognizing and accommodating harm caused by violent (and
particularly, sexually violent) crimes. Although losses arising from
financial and property crimes are more easily quantifiable, victims of
violent crimes are as entitled to full restitution as victims of financial or
property crimes. Sexually violent crimes inflict severe harm on citizens,
particularly in the most marginalized communities of society.
Some argue that joint and several liability is perhaps too harsh.379
However, in reality, defendants would not actually have to be responsible
for the full amount of the victim’s losses because several defendants are
each contributing to pay the victim’s losses through periodic payments or
contribution suits.380 If no other offenders are chipping into a victim’s
restitution, the defendant can seek to have the restitution order
amended.381 Furthermore, most victims of child pornography are never
identified.382 Child sexual abuse is notoriously underreported and only a
fraction of victims are identified or come forward.383 As a result,
defendants typically are only ordered to pay restitution to a handful of
their victims.384
B. Periodic Payment Schedules
Opponents of joint and several liability argue that one defendant could
be held liable for the total amount of the victim’s losses. Implementing a
771–72 (5th Cir. 2012) (rejecting the argument that restitution under the MVRA and § 2259 is
subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment because the purpose of the restitution is remedial rather than punitive), rev’d sub nom. Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014).
378. See Paroline, 572 U.S. at 458 (noting that imposing restitution forces defendants to
acknowledge the consequences of their actions and reminds them of the harm that they have
caused); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986) (noting the impact that restitution can have on
defendants).
379. See Paroline, 572 U.S. at 473 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“may lead to fears of unfair
treatment for particular defendants”); see also Cassell & Marsh, supra note 18, at 6 (explaining that
Justice Sotomayor advocated for a “no safety-in-numbers” approach).
380. See Paroline, 572 U.S. at 487 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing how this also benefits
the victim as she will “be made whole for her losses”); Cassell & Marsh, supra note 18, at 12
(explaining that Congress embraced the aggregate causation that Justice Sotomayor proposed).
381. See Paroline, 572 U.S. at 487 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting how the majority decision
allows for the consideration of the number of offenders involved in estimating a restitution amount).
382. See id. at 487; CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE STATISTICS, supra note 70 (providing additional
facts stating that 38% of child victims do not disclose the fact that they have been sexually abused).
383. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE STATISTICS, supra note 70 (noting that it is difficult to pull numbers
on childhood sexual abuse, but noting that it is more common than people think and that it is severely underreported); Lollar, supra note 307, at 377–76 (noting that the real problem is sexual
abuse within familial settings).
384. See generally Seto et al., infra note 400 (noting the lack of identified victims); see e.g.,
United States v. Halverson, 897 F.3d 645, 653–54 (5th Cir. 2018) (noting that Halverson possessed
images of at least thirty-three victims, but only ordering restitution to the six known victims).
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periodic payment schedule, however, would alleviate this concern.385
Instead, through periodic payments, all defendants convicted of
possessing a victim’s images would chip in to compensate for the
victim’s losses.386 As more defendants are convicted, more offenders pay
the restitution orders.387 Once the sum of those payments equals the
amount of the victim’s losses, the restitution orders for all defendants
terminate.388
Another benefit of a periodic payment schedule is it grants courts wide
discretion in creating a payment schedule. In doing so, the court can
consider the defendant’s financial responsibilities and assets.
Furthermore, the schedules are not permanent and can be amended in the
future. Lastly, there is a body of case law guiding courts on how to set
periodic payment schedules.
C. A Cause of Action for Contribution
Another facet that will minimize unfairness is creating a cause of
action for contribution. A cause of action for contribution would allow
defendants to collect money from offenders who did not have to pay as
large of a portion.389 As a result, if an offender paid a large portion of the
losses, and other offenders are identified, the initial offender can recoup
some of the money by suing the other offenders. Or, if the restitution
order is satisfied, and other offenders are prosecuted, the offenders who
paid the restitution can sue the subsequent offenders to recuperate some
of the losses. This gives defendants the opportunity to spread losses

385. See Paroline, 572 U.S. at 485 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s
argument that imposing joint and several liability without a cause of action for contribution would
congest courts and countering that courts can order partial payment schedules instead).
386. See id. at 487 (explaining that an individual defendant’s restitution payment would be substantially offset by payments made by other offenders).
387. See id. (explaining that the offset would be significant with new offenders added every
month).
388. 18 U.S.C. § 2259 (noting that the restitution payments would terminate when the victim
receives compensation for the full amount of her losses); see Paroline, 572 U.S. at 487 n.5 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that the convicted offenders would all be paying into the victim’s
restitution order).
389. See Reid & Collier, supra note 21, at 676–77 (stating that contribution forces responsible
parties to resolve their relative shares between themselves); but see Nw. Airlines v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 86–87 (1981) (“At common law there was no right to contribution
among joint tortfeasors. In most American jurisdictions, however, that rule has been changed either
by statute or by judicial decision.” (citations omitted)).
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around themselves. Lastly, it could incentivize offenders to identify other
offenders because they have a financial stake in sharing the costs.
D. The Eighth Amendment
In dicta, Justice Kennedy contemplated whether joint and several liability for child pornography cases “with no legal or practical avenue for
seeking contribution” was so severe as to place it under the scope of
Eighth Amendment.390 In this analysis, Justice Kennedy noted that “the
Excessive Fines Clause was intended to limit only those fines directly
imposed by, and payable to, the government.”391
This Eighth Amendment analysis should not be applied to criminal
restitution.392 First, the Supreme Court has never held that criminal
restitution is subject to the Excessive Fines Clause.393 Although the
government prosecutes the matter, restitution serves a different purpose
than fines and asset forfeitures.394 The monies from fines and asset
forfeitures go back to the federal government.395 Conversely, restitution
compensates victims—it is not collected for use and benefit by the
government.396 This fundamental distinction is important because the
government has no ulterior incentive to pursue restitution awards. Aside
from some moral satisfaction and possibly some good will among the
public, the government benefits in no way from this litigation and these
awards. On one hand, restitution is fundamentally different from fines
and asset forfeiture. On the other hand, this dicta in Paroline justified the
cautious approach taken by the Department of Justice and Congress.
Unless the Supreme Court fleshes out whether restitution really falls
390. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 455.
391. Id. at 456 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257, 268 (1989)).
392. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 455–56; see generally Kevin Bennardo, Restitution and the Excessive Fines Clause, 77 LA. L. REV. 21 (2016); but see Cassell & Marsh, supra note 18, at 11 (arguing that restitution should not fall under the Eighth Amendment analysis).
393. Bennardo, supra note 392, at 21 (remarking that the Supreme Court has not ruled on criminal restitution coming within the scope of the Eighth Amendment); Paroline, 572 U.S. at 455–56
(alluding that restitution may come under the scope of the Eighth Amendment).
394. Kelco, 492 U.S. at 264–65 (limiting the excessive fines clause to “payment to a sovereign
as punishment for some offense” or “when the government neither has prosecuted the action nor
has any right to receive a share of the damages awarded.”); but see generally Bennardo, supra note
392 (arguing that criminal restitution should be subject to the Excessive Fines Clause).
395. Anne Teigen & Lucia Bragg, Evolving Civil Asset Forfeiture Laws, NAT’L CONF. STATE
LEGISLATURES (Feb. 2018), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/evolvingcivil-asset-forfeiture-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/8VX2-54DT].
396. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 455–56 (remarking that joint and several liability may be so severe
that it could raise concerns under the Eighth Amendment, even though restitution is compensatory
in nature and is not currently regulated under the Eighth Amendment); see generally Bennardo,
supra note 392 (considering the purposes of criminal restitution, its role in the criminal process,
and the punitive impact that it has on defendants).
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under the scope of the Eighth Amendment, Paroline’s dicta may be a
reason against imposing joint and several liability.397
Nevertheless, child pornography offenses, even possession, are serious
crimes that should pass the muster of the Eighth Amendment analysis.398
Under the Eighth Amendment, fines are only excessive if they are grossly
disproportional to the crime.399 Imposing joint and several liability for
such heinous crimes is not inherently disproportionate. Investigators are
seeing increases in penetration, sadomasochism, and drugging of
minors.400 Images depicting more egregious conduct are more likely to
be actively traded.401 The only thing that investigators are seeing
decrease is the age of the victim: more toddlers and infants are being
abused.402 The imagery traded by offenders documents child rape.403

397. Cassell & Marsh, supra note 18, at 11 (“[R]estitution . . . is not a punitive measure . . . but
rather is a compensation regimin [sic] designed to restore crime victims. . . . [A] ‘fine’ is a ‘pecuniary criminal punishment or civil penalty payable to the public treasury.’” (quoting Fine, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004))); but see Paroline, 572 U.S. at 456 (highlighting that restitution
is ordered in a criminal proceeding and serves punitive purposes).
398. Cassell & Marsh, supra note 18, at 11 (noting that child pornography offenses are punished
by lengthy prison terms and some mandatory sentences); but see Lollar, supra note 307, at 371
(arguing that offenders of child pornography are “more empathetic” and “less likely to engage in
sexually risky behaviors” compared to hands-on offenders).
399. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998), superseded by statute, 31 U.S.C.
§ 5332, as recognized in United States v. Del Toro-Barboza, 673 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The
amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed
to punish.”); Cassell & Marsh, supra note 18, at 11 (arguing that full restitution under the standard
is not excessive because of the severity of child pornography offenses—pointing to the long prison
sentences).
400. Michael C. Seto et al., Production and Active Trading of Child Sexual Exploitation Images
Depicting Identified Victims, NAT’L CTR. MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILD. 47 (Mar. 2018),
https://www.missingkids.org/content/dam/missingkids/pdfs/ncmec-analysis/Production%20and%20Active%20Trading%20of%20CSAM_FullReport_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F87V-45GZ] (noting the various scales that researchers use to classify the severity of the child sexual abuse imagery); WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 7 (explaining
a scale that investigators and researchers use to classify images of children—from indicative (which
are nonsexualized images) to sadistic/bestiality (which are images depicting children in pain or
forced into sexual contact with animals)).
401. Seto et al., supra note 400, at 42 (“The historical dataset suggests there has indeed been a
shift toward more egregious content over time, with more content rated at levels 3 or 4 on the sexual
activity scale in later years.”); see WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35, at 21 (noting that child
sexual abuse imagery is being used to groom future victims, cyberstalk victims, promote child sex
tourism, and traffic children).
402. See Keller & Dance, supra note 13 (“In a particularly disturbing trend, online groups are
devoting themselves to sharing images of younger children and more extreme forms of abuse.”);
see, e.g., United States v. Bordman, 895 F.3d 1048, 1051–52 (8th Cir. 2018) (explaining that the
defendant possessed sexual abuse images of toddlers and infants and that the defendant was sexually exploiting his toddler).
403. See DOJ CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 72, at 2–3 (“While ‘child pornography’ is
the term commonly used by lawmakers, prosecutors, investigators, and the public to describe this
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Possession of these images is a huge invasion of the most intimate aspects
of these victims’ lives.404 Additionally, these victims are the most
vulnerable. Due to the nature of the content and the abuse, it should come
as no surprise that those victims will require significant compensation for
their losses caused by the trauma.405 Furthermore, possession fuels the
distribution and production of images, and with the internet age,
offenders are seeking more severe content in the images.406
E. Arguments Against Restitution
One argument against restitution is that victims could simply utilize
existing civil remedies. However, resorting to other existing civil
remedies is not suitable for victims or defendants.407 This process forces
victims to initiate a separate civil lawsuit, hire private counsel, and prove
their case, which would initiate another long, legal process to which only
a few defendants would be subjected.408 Additionally, there is a $150,000
minimum damages recovery.409 While this is good for victims, it hinges
on suing defendants that have the assets to pay for it, which could lead to
wealthier defendants bearing larger amounts of the victim’s losses.410
Another argument against restitution in child pornography cases is that
form of sexual exploitation of children, that term largely fails to describe the true horror . . . . [V]ictims are first sexually assaulted in order to produce the vile, and often violent, images.”); see
NCMEC Overview, supra note 1 (explaining that child pornography does not accurately capture
what is depicted because the term “pornography” implies consent which these minors do not have).
404. See Reid & Collier, supra note 21, at 666 (noting that the possessor violates the victim’s
privacy); see also Gewirtz-Meydan et al., supra note 67, at 244–45 (explaining the constant fear
that several victims report because the images are on the internet and can be used against them, but
also remarking the images validate that the crimes occurred to them).
405. Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 435 (2014) (“Here, the victim’s costs of treatment
and lost income resulting from the trauma of knowing that images of her abuse are being viewed
over and over are direct and foreseeable results of child-pornography crimes . . . .”); Cassell &
Marsh, supra note 18, at 13–14 (noting that defendants’ actions are more similar to intentional torts
and as a result, it is foreseeable that victims will suffer significant harms).
406. United States v. Monzel, 930 F.3d 470, 483 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (explaining that possession
has a synergistic impact on production and distribution); Carey, supra note 94 (noting that online
communities and easy access to materials lower pedophiles’ inhibitions, making them more likely
to more frequently offend with greater severity).
407. See United States v. Berry, No. 1:18-00107, 2019 WL 5306960, at *2 (D. Or. Oct. 21,
2019) (explaining that victims will be able to access funds more quickly); see KENDALL & FUNK,
supra note 11, at 249–51 (explaining the importance of proceedings in these kinds of cases because
the victim needs to be able to move on).
408. See generally Masha’s Law, 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (providing victims a civil cause of action
against offenders of child pornography); Marsh, supra note 11, at 474 (noting that the victim has
to prove that he or she is a victim of one of the enumerated child exploitation statutes).
409. 18 U.S.C. § 2255.
410. See generally id. (noting that there is a ten year statute of limitations starting from the time
that the victim learns of a violation or injury that forms the basis of the claim or ten years after the
victim turns eighteen); Marsh, supra note 11, at 474 (highlighting that a victim does not need to
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focusing on child sexual abuse imagery diverts the attention from child
sexual abuse within the family.411 This argument presents a valid point:
there should be higher awareness that physical sexual abuse of minors is
overwhelmingly perpetrated by family members or people close to the
victim, and not by strangers.412 However, child sexual abuse is
prosecuted primarily by state governments, while child pornography is
prosecuted primarily by the federal government.413 Additionally, the
production, distribution, and possession of child sexual abuse imagery
inflicts an additional harm on victims because the images are in the public
and their abuse is broadcasted to countless strangers. 414 There is no
reason why the efforts to curb the child sexual abuse imagery industry
and familial child sexual abuse cannot be effectuated concurrently.
Clarifying misconceptions about child sexual abuse, promoting a culture
where victims feel more empowered to report, and raising criminal
penalties for state sex crimes are all efforts that should be taken to reduce
the physical sexual abuse.415 However, criminal restitution can work
toward combating child sexual abuse on the market level because it is
leveraged on the consumers of the child sexual abuse imagery—the
distributors and possessors.
Overall, this approach allows for an alternative apportionment that
avoids the issues with arbitrariness of the current system, but makes it

prove that the defendant was convicted under one of these statutes—but noting that in actuality, the
courts have demanded levels of proof that align with the criminal standard).
411. Lollar, supra note 307, at 377 (noting that abuse within the family goes undetected); CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE STATISTICS, supra note 70, at 1, 7 (noting that it is difficult to pull numbers on
childhood sexual abuse, but noting that it is more common than people think and that it is severely
underreported).
412. Lollar, supra note 307, at 347 (“Imposing restitution on individuals unknown to the child
contributes to the perpetuation of the ‘stranger-danger’ myth by focusing on unfamiliar individuals
who view child pornography rather than those intimate members of the child’s inner circle who
create it.”); see also ADAMS & FLYNN, supra note 371, at 2 (noting that possession and distribution
offenses are prosecuted at far greater levels than production charges).
413. Lollar, supra note 307, at 376 (“[I]t is the familial and social circumstances of young children that are the primary factors in their victimization.” (quoting Dean D. Knudsen, Child Sexual
Abuse and Pornography: Is There a Relationship?, 3 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 253, 263 (1988))); see
generally Seto et al., supra note 400 (reporting various statistics indicating that minors are abused
more often by family members, that those family members are more likely to engage in more severe
conduct, and that family members are more likely to record and disseminate the abuse).
414. See generally Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014) (all justices recognizing the
harm that victims suffer as a result of the trafficking of images depicting their abuse); see also New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–57 (1982) (recognizing a compelling need to protect children
from commercial sexual exploitation).
415. See generally Lollar, supra note 307 (explaining that there needs to be more awareness
and action taken to address the root of familial sexual abuse); see also Cassell & Marsh, supra note
18, at 9–10 (advocating for a system that will provide full recovery to victims).
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more likely for victims to recover their full losses.416 Joint and several
liability with a periodic payment schedule forces all convicted defendants
to pool together to pay the victim restitution in the full amount of the
victim’s losses and incentivizes defendants to cooperate with law
enforcement.417 However, the biggest challenge to this solution is
Paroline’s dicta that considers whether restitution should be under the
scope of the Eighth Amendment.418 The Excessive Fines Clause should
not apply because the primary goal of restitution is not punitive but rather
compensatory and the government does not take the property or money
(the victim does).419 Moreover, child pornography offenses are very
serious: high amounts of restitution that come as a result of the horrific
abuse that victims endure should not be considered excessive.420
VI. CONCLUSION
The child sexual abuse imagery industry inflicts inexpressible trauma
on its victims,421 who are among the most vulnerable. Due to the newness
of the laws,422 there is significant room for development to address a
crime that has reached new levels since the dawn of the internet age.423
With the help of the internet, offenders of child pornography crimes do
not act in isolation. Rather, they are a part of a criminal web that trades
416. See generally supra Part V (explaining that district courts would not have discretion to
order restitution amounts); see also Paroline, 572 U.S. at 486–87 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (explaining how the restitution system would balance the rights of victims and defendants).
417. See supra Part V (explaining that defendants would pay less if more defendants are convicted).
418. See Paroline, 572 U.S. at 455–56 (explaining that the approach is so severe that it could
implicate the Eighth Amendment); see also supra Part V (noting in dicta that although restitution
has never been subject to the scope of the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court conceivably
could extend restitution to the scope of the Eighth Amendment).
419. See Cassell & Marsh, supra note 18, at 11 (noting that the goal of restitution is to compensate the victim for his or her losses); Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance
Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-299, 132 Stat. 4383 (codified as amended 18 U.S.C. § 2259) (“It is
the intent of Congress that victims of child pornography be compensated . . . .”).
420. See Cassell & Marsh, supra note 18, at 11 (arguing that restitution under the Eighth
Amendment should not be excessive because child pornography offenses are serious crimes); see
generally Audrey Rogers, Child Pornography’s Forgotten Victims, 28 PACE L. REV. 847 (2008)
(dispelling the misconceptions that child pornography is a less serious offense).
421. See generally SURVIVORS’ SURVEY, supra note 5 (reporting the instances of psychological
disorders that victims have); see Gewirtz-Meydan et al., supra note 67, at 239, 243, 246 (noting the
feelings that victims possess); Paroline, 572 U.S. at 440 (explaining the relapse of trauma that Amy
endured after learning of the publication of her images).
422. KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 11, at 81–82 (noting that child sexual abuse imagery was
not criminalized until the late 1970s); see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982)
(holding that child sexual abuse imagery is not protected under the First Amendment).
423. See generally WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35 (explaining that the boom of the
internet has transformed the child sexual abuse imagery industry); see also DOJ CONGRESSIONAL
REPORT, supra note 72 (detailing the complications in investigating and prosecuting child pornography offenses because of the amount and international aspect resulting from the internet).
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images of exploited minors.424 In Paroline, the Supreme Court created
an unworkable framework for ordering restitution.425 The decision led to
the circuit split on disaggregation, which exemplifies the difficulties and
complications in applying the Paroline framework.426
At the end of the day, victims are being left to bear the costs of their
harm simply because too many people are hurting them.427 Child
pornography offenses are unique crimes which require an individually
tailored response. Joint and several liability, while not appropriate for
other crimes, is precisely the response warranted for these distinctive
offenses because there are so many defendants; there are growing
conviction rates; and victims suffer a single, indivisible injury.428
Including partial payment schedules and a claim for contribution balances
the defendants’ interests with the victims’ interests by allowing
defendants to spread the losses between offenders. Ultimately, what is
needed is a system that sensitively approaches the unique hardship that
victims of child pornography suffer and ensures that the victims who have
been cut a thousand times recover just the same as victims of other
crimes.429

424. See supra Part II (explaining the networks in which child pornography offenders operate);
see generally WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 35 (also explaining child pornography networks).
425. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 449–63 (confronting the complex issue of causation); see Cassell &
Marsh, supra note 18, at 6–8 (discussing the “uneven implementation” of Paroline).
426. See generally United States v. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2019) (rejecting disaggregation for being arbitrary); United States v. Monzel, 930 F.3d 470, 483, 485 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
(also rejecting disaggregation as arbitrary).
427. See United States v. Whitely, 354 F. Supp. 3d 930, 939 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (commenting that
the criminal justice system is failing victims of sexual exploitation).
428. See generally supra Part V; see also Paroline, 572 U.S. at 473, 481 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (providing explanation for why joint and several liability is appropriate for child pornography offenses).
429. See generally supra Part V; see also Paroline, 572 U.S. at 472, 477 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he victim must ‘go through life knowing that the recording is circulating within the
mass distribution system for child pornography.’” (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759
n.10 (1982))).

